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When I was a staff attorney for a Puget Sound Tribe in Washington, local
property owners sued the Tribe, objecting to the Tribe's new housing
development. They were a group of local non-Indian landowners residing
within the reservation boundaries trying to stop the development. Many of them
had moved out across the sound to get away from the city lights of Seattle, and
they fought development unless it was their own. Others were long-time
residents who had been fighting the Tribe tooth-and-nail for decades. In their
complaint, which could have been a form prepared by the Federal District Court
for the Western District of Washington in Tacoma based on how often these
types of complaints are filed against Washington tribes, they claimed the
reservation was disestablished and the Tribe wasn't really the successor in
interest to the people that signed the treaty in 1855, the same arguments many
of the same people had made in cases like United States v. Washington2 and
United States v. Aam.3 Their attorneys - my co-worker called them "elevator
lawyers" - practically threw the entire collected volumes of the United States
Reports, the Federal Reporter Third, the United States Code, and the Code of
Federal Regulations at the Tribe. Instead of just trying to oppose the
development, they argued that the Tribe should be gone for good.
A few weeks after I began work on the responsive pleading it was time for my
dentist appointment, so I drove over to the Indian Health Service clinic to see a
dentist. After the standard IHS wait, I was called in and a woman I'll call Kelly
Clark cleaned my teeth. I recognized the name Kelly Clark from the caption on
the complaint. One of the local landowners calling for the end of the Tribe was
named Kelly Clark. I didn't think too much of it and I didn't say anything to the
woman holding my mouth open. I figured there were many Kelly Clarks out
there. Next day, I said something to one of the women working for the Tribe's
housing department, joking that Kelly Clark, one of our "deadliest enemies,"4
was an IHS employee and had cleaned my teeth. The housing department
employee knew Kelly Clark because she had kids who went to the dental clinic.
She pointedly informed me that Kelly Clark the Indian Fighter and Kelly Clark
the Indian Health Service dental hygienist were one and the same. She wouldn't
let this Kelly Clark even look at her kids, let alone clean their teeth. Kelly Clark
probably wouldn't have ajob but for the recognition of the Puget Sound Tribes
in United States v. Washington5 and yet, she found the time and resources to
help finance a lawsuit to overturn many of its core principles.
2. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), affd, 520 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975).
3. 670 F. Supp. 306 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff'd, 887 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1989).
4. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
5. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1989).
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That is a backdrop of Federal Indian Law.6
Federal Indian Law is a complex body of law growing more multifarious each
day.7 Title 25 of the United States Code already encompasses four volumes in
the United States Code Annotated and Congress could easily add a few more
volumes by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century.8 The three
levels of sovereignty in the United States - federal, state, and tribal9 -
practically guarantee work for lawyers involved in tribal issues for the
foreseeable future. With the additional complexity and expansion of federal
statutes and regulations comprising Federal Indian Law comes increasing
exposure of Indians and Indian tribes to federal and state courtrooms and
administrative adjudicatory forums, federal and state legislatures and legislative
committees, and administrative rulemaking. This state of affairs is no different
for any of the other subjects covered in the remaining forty-nine titles in the U.S.
Code, but unlike most other subjects comprising federal law, Federal Indian Law
comes replete with emotional and passionate history both in nationhood and in
family.
Law for Indians is not sterile. Indians focus more on the interconnection
between human beings and the natural world that surrounds them. Indian
leaders expressed that understanding, passion, and intense emotion when the
federal government forced them to sign removal agreements or land cession
agreements under duress and they could not stop crying for the loss of their
lands and people. Pokagon, one of the principle chiefs of the Potawatomi and
my relative, "cried like a child as he signed" an 1833 treaty that caused the
removal of hundreds of his people.'0 Tribal leaders, in tears and under duress,
6. "Indian sovereignty is 'a backdrop against which the applicable... federal statutes must
be read."' Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 701 (1 st Cir. 1994) (quoting
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973)).
7. At least three Supreme Court Justices admit that, in the context of Indian tribal
adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers, the Court's "own pronouncements on the issue have
pointed in seemingly opposite directions." Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 376 (2001) (Souter,
J., concurring).
8. But see generally Letter from Neal A. McCaleb, Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs, U.S.
Department of the Interior, to Sue Masten and Tex Hall, Co-Chairs, Trust Reform Task Force,
National Congress of American Indians 1 (June 20, 2002) (on file with author) (informing
recipients that the Department of Interior will recommend to repeal "outdated and conflicting
laws" in Title 25).
9. See generally Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons From the Third Sovereign: Indian
Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1 (1997) (acknowledging Indian tribes as one of the three
sovereigns in the United States).
10. Elizabeth A. Neumeyer, Indian Removal in Michigan, 1833-1855, at 21 (1968)
(unpublished M.A. dissertation, Central Michigan University) (on file with author).
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signed away large portions of their reservations to land reclamation and other
Bureau of Land Management projects in the Secretary of Interior's office in the
1940s and 1950s."
Just as Congress can take away, it can also give. Occasionally, Congress
establishes an Indian tribe's very existence as a viable political entity in the
United States form of government. For example, several Indian tribes are
federally recognized Indian tribes only because of their inclusion in the U.S.
Code via an Act of Congress. Examples from the past several years include the
act restoring federal recognition to the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians, 2
the Auburn Indian Restoration Act, 3 the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa
Indians and the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Act, 4 the Paskenta Band of
Nomlaki Indians of California Act, 5 and the Graton Rancheria Restoration
Act.'6 Without their inclusion on a list prepared and expanded only by political
actors, those Indian tribes do not exist in the eyes of the federal government. 17
Though these Indian tribes have existed for centuries longer than the United
States government and every other national government in the Western
Hemisphere, they must stoop to seek recognition from the still-immature
American government. An Indian tribe may not simply file a copy of its
constitution and bylaws like corporations. Unrecognized Indian tribes are
forced to live outside the boundaries of federal law, rendering them completely
unprotected and completely without rights as Indian tribes. From the
11. The emotional strain experienced by tribal leaders was evident and documented by
many.
Although the [Supreme] Court suggests that the Cheyenne River Sioux consented
to the taking of their lands for the Oahe dam and reservoir. . . , anyone who
doubts that the tribes on whose reservations Pick-Sloan reservoirs were located
were under duress should examine the photograph of George Gillette, the Tribal
Chairman of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, who
broke down in tears while signing the contract with the Army Corps of Engineers
for the Garrison Dam and reservoir.
Dean B. Suagee & Christopher T. Stearns, Indigenous Self-Government, Environmental
Protection, and the Consent of the Governed, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 59, 74 n.56
(1994) (photo reproduced in NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY: A CHRONICLE OF INDIAN-WHITE
RELATIONS FROM PROPHECY TO THE PRESENT, 1492-1992, at 343 (Peter Nabokov ed., 1991)).
12. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1300j-1300j-8 (2000).
13. 25 U.S.C. §§ 13001-13001-7 (2000).
14. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1300k-1300k-7 (2000).
15. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1300m-1300m-7 (2000).
16. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1300n-1300n-6 (2000).
17. See Western Shoshone Bus. Council for & on Behalf of the Western Shoshone Tribe
of the Duck Reservation v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1052, 1057 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[T]heTribe's absence
from [Interior's] list [of federally recognized tribes] is dispositive.").
[Vol. 28
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perspective of the federal government, the genocide perpetrated on all Indians 18
is complete for tribes that are unrecognized - and for the federal government,
that is okay. 9
The genocide perpetrated on Indian people is unprecedented in world history
in terms of its continuity.2" Even many schoolchildren now know that the
Cristobal Col6n of 1492 was no hero, 2' but very few schoolchildren are taught
that the acts of genocide continued well into the present generation. For
example, from at least the 1930s until the 1980s, the federal government
perpetrated forced sterilizations upon Indian women. 22 As much as forty-two
percent of all Indian women of childbearing age had been forcibly sterilized by
the early 1980s.23 Around the same time, Congress passed the Indian Child
18. See generally Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation 1830-
1976: The United States Government's Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and Execution
of the Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911 (2002) (arguing
that the federal government's actions in dealing with Indians and Indian tribes amounts to
genocide).
19. See generally Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections
on the Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 203, 218 (1989)
("Whatever motives of justice may inspire congressional action, the usual practice of allowing
the administrative branch to promulgate the rules and regulations under which the statute will
be enforced and the programs implemented quickly blunts any sense of having won
something.").
20. Cf DAVID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: THE CONQUEST OFTHE NEW WORLD
xiv (1992) (describing the continuing genocide against Native peoples throughout the Western
Hemisphere). Stannard wrote:
Reminders are all around us, if we care to look, that the fifteenth- and
sixteenth-century extermination of the indigenous peoples of Hispaniola, brought
on by European military assault and the importation of exotic diseases, was in part
only an enormous prelude to human catastrophes that followed on other killing
grounds, and continue to occur today - from the forests of Brazil and Paraguay
and elsewhere in South and Central America, where direct government violence
still slaughters thousands of Indian people year in and year out, to the reservations
and urban slums of North America, where more sophisticated indirect government
violence has precisely the same effect - all the while that Westerners engage in
exultation over the 500th anniversary of the European discovery of America, the
time and the place where all the killing began.
Id. at xiv.
21. See generally KIRKPATRICK SALE, THE CONQUEST OF PARADISE: CHRISTOPHER
COLUMBUS AND THE COLUMBIAN LEGACY (1990) (depicting Columbus as the sad product of a
disease-ridden, war-ravaged Europe).
22. See Glauner, supra note 18, at 939 (citing Rennard Strickland, The Genocidal Premise
in Native American Law and Policy: Exorcising Aboriginal Ghosts, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
325,328 (1998)).
23. WARD CHURCHIuLL, A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE
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Welfare Act2 4 in part because state courts were contributing part and parcel to
the destruction of whole generations of Indian families.25 Twenty-five to thirty-
five percent of all Indian children had been separated from their families.26 The
result was often suicide.2 ' That amounts to one quarter to over one third of
Indian children. In yet another example of genocide, Congress systematically
destroyed Indian tribes' land base before, 28 during,29 and after the allotment
AMERICAS 1492 TO THE PRESENT 249-50 (1997) (arguing as much as forty-two percent were
sterilized); see also PAULA GUNN ALLEN, OFFTHE RESERVATION: REFLECTIONS ON BOUNDARY-
BUSTING, BORDER-CROSSING, LOOSECANONS 38 (1998) (arguing more than twenty-five percent
were sterilized).
24. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1903, 1911-1923, 1931-1934, 1951-1952, 1961-1963 (2000).
25. See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(4), (5) (2000) (finding that an "alarmingly high
percentage" of Indian families are broken up, an "alarmingly high percentage" of Indian
children are placed in non-Indian foster homes, and states often fail to recognize essential tribal
relations and prevailing social and cultural standards of Indian people); Yavapai-Apache Tribe
v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 162 (Tex. App. 1995) ("Thus, by passing the ICWA, Congress
sought to ensure the continued viability of Indian tribes by protecting Indian children from
cultural genocide.") (citation omitted); Quinn v. Walters, 881 P.2d 795, 803 (Or. 1994)
(Fadeley, J. dissenting) ("Without notice to the tribe or valid consent, an adoption is an act of
genocide, an elimination of the tribe's future.").
26. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32-33 (1989)
(citing Indian Child Welfare Program, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 3 (1974) (statement of William
Byler)).
27. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1075-77 (Okla. 1985) (footnote and
citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Harjo v. Duello, 484 U.S. 1072 (1988).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 208 (W.D. Mich. 1979) ("The
liquidation of Indian reservations in the Old Northwest was largely accomplished between 1829
and 1843.").
29. See HON. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 22 (3rd ed.
1998). Canby, a Senior Ninth Circuit Judge, wrote:
The primary effect of the Allotment Act was a precipitous decline in the total
amount of Indian-held land, from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million in 1934.
Of the 48 million acres that remained, some 20 million were desert or semidesert.
Much of the land was lost by sale as tribal surplus; the remainder passed out of the
hands of allottees. Allottees who received patents after 25 years found themselves
subject to state taxation, and many forced sales resulted from non-payment. In
addition, the Indians' new power to sell land provided many opportunities for
non-Indians to negotiate purchases of allotted lands on terms quite
disadvantageous to the Indians. The allottees were frequently left with neither their
land nor with any benefits that might have resulted from its disposition.
[Vol. 28
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era,30 an example at least one Supreme Court Justice acknowledged as
genocide.3
That is also the backdrop of Federal Indian Law.
Judicial opinions and legislative determinations in Federal Indian Law impact
Native Americans and Indian tribes to the very core of their being. Corporations
winning or losing tax shelter cases do not feel the emotional impact of an
emotionless judicial opinion written in a vacuum like a traditional Indian
winning or losing the right to participate in healing and cleansing ceremonies
while incarcerated.32 Whether or a not a condominium development company
succeeds in removing a notice of lis pendens on their proposed development
property does not invoke the passion or sense of justice and injustice tribal
members feel when their reservation boundaries that they have held sacred for
over a hundred years are declared disestablished by federal statutes and treaty
interpretations they never agreed to and could never have anticipated.
Judges writing the opinions in federal and state courts must refuse to allow
their emotions to control their rulings, lest they fail to remain impartial
adjudicators. Yet, attorneys and policymakers that shape Federal Indian Law in
other ways can, and often do, allow their emotions to shape policy. In fact,
emotions often serve to dramatically alter the landscape of the political world
and, by extension, the statutory and regulatory landscape that molds our
everyday existence. In Federal Indian Law, absent emotional calls for reform
from the states or the tribes, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,33 the Indian
30. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in
Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 364 (1953) [hereinafter Cohen, Erosion of Indian Rights]
("Within the past two years, the former habit of Indian Bureau officials of disposing of Indian
tribal lands without the consent of the Indians - a practice which has already resulted in more
than 80 million dollars in judgments against the United States by its own courts - generally
has been reestablished as approved Interior Department practice.") (footnote and citations
omitted).
31. See County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 276 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("'Allotment and the subsequent sale or lease
of Indian lands accomplished what the 'genocide' of epidemics, war and bootlegged alcohol had
not been able to do: a systematic 'ethnocide' brought about by a loss of Indian identity with the
loss of land."') (quoting HELEN H. SCHUSTER, THE YAKIMAS: A CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 70
(1982)).
32. See, e.g., LEONARD PELTIER, PRISON WRITINGS: MY LIFE IS MY SUNDANCE 183-98
(Harvey Arden, ed. 1999).
33. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467-2486 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721
(2000)).
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Reorganization Act,34 and the so-called Duro Fix,35 attempting to repeal Duro
v. Reina,6 would not exist.
For one reason or another, state and federal courts often do not assess the
human impacts of their decisions. Often, strict constructionism dominates the
courts to the detriment of Indians and Indian tribes.37 Perhaps tribal courts can
serve as a model for federal and state court judges. As the former Chief Judge
of the Grand Traverse Band Tribal Court put it in 1996, "[o]ne of the important
concerns that should always be at the forefront of the decision-making process
is the social (community) consequences of a particular contemplated action or
decision."38 It seems so simple, yet the profundity of this comment must be
emphasized, especially considering the harshness of results of many federal and
state court decisions.
The new generation of treaty-making is underway and Indian tribes are fast
falling behind the states, the corporations, and the federal government, losing
ground gained at various times and places and losing that ground in federal
courts.
With the advent of Indian Gaming3 9 and Self-Determination (even self-
reliance4°), Indians and Indian tribes are on the cusp of real political power. For
some tribes, the money is already there to make huge strides and power plays in
34. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-463 (2000)).
35. Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1892 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (3)
(2000)).
36. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
37. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451-52
(1988) (finding that the Constitution does not expressly protect tribal religions and denying the
tribal petitioners relief).
38. Raphael v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 90-01-001, at 2
(Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct., Apr. 16, 1996) (Michael Petoskey, C.J.), affd, Appellate
Decision, No. 90-01-CV (Grand Traverse Band Ct. App., Oct. 15, 1999) (on file with author).
39. See generally California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 218-19
(1987) ("The Cabazon and Morongo Reservations contain no natural resources which can be
exploited. The tribal games at present provide the sole source of revenues for the operation of
the tribal governments and the provision of tribal services. They are also the major sources of
employment on the reservations. Self-determination and economic development are not within
reach if the Tribes cannot raise revenues and provide employment for their members."); 25
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000) (Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
40. See generally Colman McCarthy, Congress Kicking Indians While They're Down,
GRAND RAPIDS (MICH.) PRESS, Sept. 22, 1995 (copy on file with author) ("Another argument
heard in the House and Senate to justify the budgetary hacking is that Indians, along with others
on welfare, need to acquire self-reliance. It's forgotten that social programs for Indians are
matters of justice, not charity, largesse or the dole.").
[Vol. 28
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the halls of state legislatures and in Congress,4' even if state and federal courts
remain reluctant to acknowledge tribal sovereignty.
Part I of this article examines three older Supreme Court decisions, the cases
that form the backdrop of modem Indian Law as interpreted and enforced by
federal courts, the federal government, and even Indian tribes. Part II examines
five Supreme Court cases decided in the so-called Modem Era of Indian Law
and the species of cases that followed each specific decision. Part III of this
article explores a hypothetical scenario in which a small Indian tribe in
Michigan learns that the mythical Fountain of Youth actually exists and that it
is situated on land owned in trust for the benefit of the tribe by the federal
government; how that tribe acquires self-reliance; and how Congress decides to
solve "the Indian Problem" with one swift stroke.
In its conclusion, this article calls for practitioners to assess the impact that
federal and state litigation has on the everyday world of Indians throughout the
United States. The meaning of Indian Law cases are right there on the page in
black and white, buried beneath blank citations to the Marshall Trilogy, the
Indian Reorganization Act, the special canon for construction of Indian statutes
and treaties, and all the rest - the faceless boilerplate of Federal Indian Law.
Most importantly, this article asks tribal attorneys (and tribal leaders) to look to
a future where many Indian tribes will gamer unprecedented political power.
We should be aware of the possible pitfalls and the potential advantages.
All of the cases reviewed in this article have been carefully analyzed and
revisited by academics and practitioners alike in a plethora of excellent books,
articles, and other commentary.4' It is easy for new tribal attorneys to lose sight
of the forest for all the trees when reviewing and analyzing Federal Indian Law.
Yet it is all right there if one takes the time to look for it.
I. Historical Cases
The Supreme Court has passed judgment on Indians and Indian tribes
throughout its history in sometimes brutal and pitiless language, defining the
41. See, e.g., Philip Matier& Andrew Ross, State Indian Tribes Cover Their Political Bets
with Cash, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Jan. 8,2003, at A17 ("[T]he state's Indian tribes have emerged
as some of California's biggest political donors in recent years, handing out millions to [Cal.
Gov. Gray] Davis and other pols alone.").
42. E.g., DAVID E. WLKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE (1997) [hereinafter WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT]; David Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The
Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Colorblind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86
MINN. L. REV. 267 (2001) [hereinafter Getches, Beyond Indian Law].
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term "Indian" as synonymous with "savage" or "uncivilized" or
"barbarous/barbaric," 43 as though the Brethren believed Crazy Horse or Chief
Pokagon would ride into D.C. like the British and destroy the immature Nation's
capitol just as the Vandals sacked Rome. Fear in that vein spawned the
Wounded Knee and Sand Creek massacres."a Apparently, the dominant
culture's fear of Indians from before the beginning of this Nation's history has
made its mark on this highest court of law.
The definition of "Indian" by the Supreme Court still sits squarely in the
broad tapestry of federal common law underlying all decisions the current Court
makes involving Indian tribes and Indians. Though the terms "savage" and
"barbaric" no longer permeate Supreme Court opinions, the Court still relies
ever more heavily on the same atavistic opinions and reasoning. Of course, the
Court must surely understand that to reject those old opinions would possibly
unravel the fabric of modem Indian Law jurisprudence. 45 Maybe the modem
43. See generally Felix Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 263
(1950) (comparing United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876), and United States v. Sandoval,
231 U.S. 28 (1913)). Cohen wrote:
Take, for example, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Joseph, and in United States v. Sandoval. Both cases involved the
question whether the people of the Rio Grande Pueblos were or were not Indians.
In the former case, the Supreme Court noted that "Integrity and virtue among them
is fostered and encouraged .... In short, they are a peaceable, industrious,
intelligent, honest, and virtuous people." The Court concluded these people were
not Indians, and therefore not entitled to the protection of federal laws prohibiting
trespass upon Indian lands. In the Sandoval case, the Court accepted evidence
supplied by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the effect that the Pueblos indulged in
"a ribald system of debauchery," "cruel and inhuman punishment," and
"immorality and a general laxness in regard to their family relations." From these
and other similar characteristics the Supreme Court concluded that the Pueblo
villages are really Indian communities after all and that its earlier decision in the
Joseph case was erroneous. The moral premise underlying both decisions is
obvious but, for reasons of politeness or otherwise, it was left unexpressed:
"Intelligent, honest, and virtuous" people cannot be Indians, but debauchery,
cruelty, inhumanity, and immorality are prima facie evidence of Indianhood.
Id. (quoting Joseph, 94 U.S. at 616, and Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 42- 44).
44. See generally Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural
Appropriation and Cultural Rights, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 319-21 (2002).
45. See generally Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or Not So Little) Constitutional
Crisis Developing in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271 (2003) [hereinafter
Pommersheim, Constitutional Crisis] (discussing United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.
2001); United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 1998), vacated by 165 F.3d 1209
(8th Cir.) (en banc); Means v. N. Cheyenne Tribal Court, 154 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 1998) (arguing
that the Duro fix may create a constitutional crisis), overruled by Enas, 255 F.3d at 675 n.8).
[Vol. 28
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Court still maintains the fear that any day they might look up from their studies
and see Winona LaDuke at the head of a horde of Anishinaabekwe (Odawa,
Potawatomi, and Ojibwe women) on horseback parading up and down the
Washington Mall, with the American military concomitantly surrendering its
arms. Or, what about if the Indians of South Dakota have voted in record
numbers and decided the race for United States Senator' Their fear of the
dominant culture, and by extension the Supreme Court, is all too apparent when
it appears that Indians and Indian tribes can make a substantial difference in the
dominant culture's political establishment. As such, the importance of the old
cases requires comment.
A. United States v. Kagama47 - Power Created Out of Thin Air
Every Indian lawyer and student of Indian Law knows about the Marshall
Trilogy48 of cases, especially given their prominent placement at the beginning
of Indian Law casebooks.49 Often, one or all of these cases begins a long
boilerplate citation of Indian Law in a legal opinion or a court opinion, but their
actual relevance to the modem era is highly suspect. Later nineteenth century
and early twentieth century cases with much less fanfare, written by much less
celebrated Justices are more persuasive to current Justices and judges, mostly
due to the cases overt rejection of Indian rights and tribal sovereignty.
Kagama is a case largely borne out of the fact that the U.S. Army had a long-
standing policy to control the Indians by destroying their food supplies and
46. The Wall Street Journal reported that: "Senate voter turnout was up 27% statewide for
this year's close contest compared with 1998, but in Shannon County turnout increased by 89%.
Again, no other county in the state showed comparable turnout increase. Shannon County is
largely Indian Country, home to the Oglala Sioux nation, and is heavily Democratic." Editorial,
The Oglala Sioux's Senator, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2002, at A14. As soon as Republican John
Thune conceded the South Dakota Senate race to Democrat Tim Johnson, conservative
commentators declared that, since the race was largely decided by Indian voters, the Democrat's
victory was "highly suspicious, if not crooked .. " Id. But see David Kranz, No Evidence
Fraud Tainted Vote Results, Barnett Says, ARGUS LEADER (SIOUX FALLS, S.D.), Nov. 21, 2002,
at A ("[W]e have yet to see evidence of widespread voter fraud, [South Dakota Attorney
General Mark Barnett] said.").
47. 118 U.S. 375 (1885).
48. The three cases comprise the origins of Federal Indian Law and the critical opinions are
all authored by Chief Justice John Marshall. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
(1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
49. E.g., DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 63-72,
104-26 (4th ed. 1998); ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 2-33 (3d ed. 1991).
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feeding them enough rations to keep Indians at or below starvation levels.50 The
Supreme Court took the fact that many Indians were dependent upon the United
States for their "daily food"'" and used that dependency to state that, as a matter
of law, "Indian tribes are the wards of the nation."52 They might well have used
the terms "slaves" or "butlers" or "mules." The Supreme Court exploited the
fact that the United States and its citizens had totally subjugated so many Indians
and tribes and practically turned them into slaves. At least one court has
acknowledged that the Court's reasoning was "an embarrassment of logic.
53
The federal government has used this ward status for the purpose of
exploiting Indians, as in the Peabody Coal case, United States v. Navajo
Nation,'M and the Individual Indian Money trust account case, Cobell v. Norton.55
Former Secretary of the Interior Donald Hodel was Peabody Coal's best friend
in 1985 by helping the mining conglomerate make amazing amounts of money
exploiting Navajo coal resources, paying only two percent of gross proceeds as
royalty to the Navajo Tribe.56 BIA officials were about to approve an increase
in royalties to twenty percent agreed to during an administrative appeal, but a
man named Stanley Hulett, a close friend of Secretary Hodel, approached him
on behalf of Peabody Coal and asked him to not increase royalties.57 Secretary
Hodel complied with Mr. Hulett's ex parte request to take personal jurisdiction
over the request and agreed to lower the royalty rate to 12.5 percent.58 The
Navajo Nation faced severe economic pressure and was forced to accept the
50. See HELEN HUNT JACKSON, A CENTURY OF DISHONOR: THE EARLY CRUSADE FOR
INDIAN REFORM 177 (Andrew F. Rolle ed., 1965) (describing the actions of the Indian Bureau
forcing Sioux bands to move against their will by placing them in "almost a starving
condition").
51. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
52. Id. at 383 (emphasis in original omitted).
53. United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 778 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Philip P.
Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REv. 31, 35 (1996)).
54. United States v. Navajo Nation, 437 U.S. 488 (2003).
55. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Cobell v. Norton, 260 F.
Supp. 2d 98, 108 (D. D.C., 2003) ("[The federal] defendants have consistently chosen the
coward's route by failing to provide the IIM beneficiaries with the information that the
beneficiaries were entitled to by law, while simultaneously insisting that they were fully
complying with their fiduciary obligations to the beneficiaries."); Cobell v. Norton, 231 F.
Supp. 2d 315, 317 (D. D.C. 2002) (finding that the "actions taken by [the Secretary of the]
Interior to be anathema to the orderly administration of this litigation").
56. Navajo Nation v. United States, 263 F.3d 1325, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
57. Brief for Respondent at 7-9, United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) (No.
01-1375).
58. Navajo Nation, 263 F.3d at 1328.
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reduced royalty rate.59 The Department did not mention to the Navajo Nation
anything about the visit from Mr. Hulett or the fact that Peabody Coal lawyers
had written the memorandum that became the Department's decision.60 The
Court ruled against the Navajo Nation, relying in part on their decision that
federal law did not prohibit the activities of either the Secretary or Peabody
Coal.61
The Individual Indian Money trust case, Cobell v. Norton, is the story about
how the BIA mishandled individual Indians' trust accounts for decades, over
generations of Indians. The BIA is in charge of royalties from natural resources
on trust land exploited by mining conglomerates. Because of a combination of
incompetence and corruption, BIA officials stole resource-rich land from
Indians, incorrectly debited amounts from trust accounts that should have been
credited, and literally skimmed money off the top of accounts into slush funds.6 2
Even when the United States assists the tribes, their motives are mixed. Vine
Deloria reported that:
A ludicrous example of jurisdictional nonsense was State v.
Moses [422 P.2d 775 (Wash. 1967)], wherein a tribe, having changed
59. Id.
60. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Congress of American Indians at 2-3, United States
v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) (No. 01-1375).
61. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 503-04. The Court cited portions of the oral argument
transcript where the Nation's attorney, Paul Frye, repeatedly reminded the Justices about the
incredible and almost fantastical behavior of the government. Id. at 503. But that hardly
captures what must have been a spirited defense of the Navajo Nation before very hostile
Justices. Before the Court, Mr. Frye characterized the case as being "about the Secretary
colluding with Peabody Coal Company to swindle the Navajo Nation." Transcript of Oral
Argument 30, United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (200) (No. 01-1375). Mr. Frye
described the government's activities as being "actively disloyal.., to the beneficiary." Id. at
34. Mr. Frye described the coal company's activity as "skullduggery." Id. at 40. Mr. Frye
described the entire process as follows:
Well, the beneficiary of a trust shouldn't have to guess what they trustee is really
telling him. If that's what his trustee wanted to say, the trustee should have said,
I've met with Peabody. I like their lobbyist. I'm not going to do something that
Peabody doesn't like and ... we're going to sit on this thing, as his subordinate
said, until hell freezes over until you agree... with something that Peabody likes
and you can live with.
Id. at 51. As Mr. Frye noted in a phrase he stole from one of the Justices' own questions,
effectively summing up the entire debacle, "[tihe key modifier is if [the Secretary] can get away
with it." Id. at 38.
62. See generally Johnnie P. Flynn, "One Family's Individual Indian Money Account
Odyssey," INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Nov. 22, 2002, available at http://www.indiancountry.
com/?1037980361 (last visited Dec. 4, 2002).
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its name to correspond with the name of its reservation, was found
not to be the signatory of the treaty. But the climax of the struggle
[for treaty fishing rights] in Washington was United States v.
Washington [520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975)], the famous "Boldt"
decision, which awarded half of the fish in the state to the Indians.
Interior Secretary Morton, allegedly the Indians' trustee, when told
that the Indians had won, wanted to appeal the decision until
informed that Interior had been supporting the tribes.63
The government that acts in this manner is the entity in which Indians and
Indian tribes are forced to place their trust.
B. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcoc 64 - The Power to Break Treaties
Lone Wolf, firmly cementing the principle of congressional plenary power
over tribal relations and tribal lands, has been called by commentators the Plessy
'v. Ferguson65 of Federal Indian Law. 66 It is as if federal courts continued to cite
to Plessy in race discrimination and affirmative action cases long after the Court
overruled Plessy in Brown v. Board of Education.67  However, unlike
desegregation, a federal court has never seriously challenged congressional
plenary power over Native Americans, Indian tribes, and their respective
property. 68
The Lone WolfCourt upheld Congress' attempts to statutorily modify a treaty
involving the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Tribes by holding that:
The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty,
though presumably such power will be exercised only when
circumstances arise which will not only justify the government in
63. Vine Deloria, Jr., Legislation and Litigation, 436 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
86, 93 (1978).
64. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
65. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
66. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for
a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REv. 77, 99 (1993) (describing Lone Wolf as
"a decision as devastating to Indians and their rights as Plessy v. Ferguson was to the cause of
civil rights for African-Americans").
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
68. See generally Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian
Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113,244 (2002) [hereinafter Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy
Clause for Indian Tribes] ("Nevertheless, despite the lack of any justification for federal
supremacy over Indian tribes that withstands careful constitutional scrutiny, cases, such as Duro
v. Reina, repeatedly suggest an overriding federal authority that binds Indian tribes.").
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disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the
interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do
so. When, therefore, treaties were entered into between the United
States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the power to
abrogate existed in Congress, and that in a contingency such power
might be availed of from considerations of governmental policy,
particularly if consistent with perfect good faith towards the
Indians.69
In essence, the Supreme Court upheld Congress' power to break treaties with
Indian tribes, treaties that constituted the sacred agreements and understandings
that, to this day, the tribes and tribal members themselves defend. The Court's
only limitation on Congress' power to break treaties with Indian tribes is the
extraordinarily subjective concept of "perfect good faith,"70 with which the
Court merely "presum[ed]" Congress would act toward the tribes.7 '
The Supreme Court created the "good faith" concept in Lone Wolf and ran
with it in cases such as United States v. Sioux Nation,72 where good faith and the
"transmutation of property doctrine" merged.73 One commentator described
Congress' position regarding Indian takings of tribal property as acting "in Lone
Wolf garb" and that Lone Wolf operates to immunize Congress "from any just
compensation claim regardless of the economic injuries that may have been
inflicted on the affected Indians."'74 For the United States as trustee to Indians
and Indian property, "good faith" of the United States is utterly meaningless.
C. Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States75 - The Power to Take Indian Property
Without Just Compensation
Often, commentators refer to the 1959 Supreme Court decision Williams v.
Lee76 as the first case in the Modem Era of Federal Indian Law.77 Unfortunately,
69. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566 (emphasis added and emphasis in original removed).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 414 (1980).
73. Id. at 416 (citing Fort Berthold v. United States, 390 F.2d 686, 691 (Ct. Cl. 1968)).
74. Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the Preservation of Indian
Country in the Twenty-First Century, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 425,473 (1998) (citing Daniel G. Kelly,
Jr., Indian Title: The Right of American Natives in Lands They Have Occupied Since Time
Immemorial, 75 CoLUM. L. REV. 655, 672-74 (1975)).
75. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
76. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
77. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE
SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1 (1987).
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the federal courts continue to read and cite Indian cases dated many years earlier
than 1959.78 The same Supreme Court Justices that decided Brown v. Board of
Education also decided Tee-Hit-Ton in 1955, a case in which dubious legal
reasoning is bolstered by blatant racism.
Tee-Hit-Ton involved a claim by Alaskan Natives to recover compensation
from the United States for its taking of timber on tribal land.7 9 The Court
rejected the claim, citing the principle established in cases such as Johnson v.
M'Intosh,8 ° that, absent a treaty or statute establishing a reservation or other
property rights, Congress may take Indian property whenever it so desires.81 In
the next sentence, Justice Reed notes that Indians aren't really worth the trouble
anyway, because:
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this
continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that,
even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for
blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will
that deprived them of their land.82
Justice Reed seemed to be saying that it was okay for the federal government to
take and take and keep taking, in part because the continual oppression of Native
Americans was justified by their savagery and weakness. Apparently, it was
meaningless to the Court that Indians were forced to give up everything because
the U.S. Army was starving them to death.83 Justice Reed concludes by
78. For example, the Supreme Court recently cited Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553
(1903), for the proposition that "Congress can unilaterally alter reservation boundaries." Hagen
v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 404 (1994). The Supreme Court often cites United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375 (1886), for the proposition that the Court has always held the interests of the states
over those of the tribes. E.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364-65 (2001); Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211 (1978). The Court cited Utah & N. R.R. Co. v.
Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885), when it stated, "'Ordinarily,' it is now clear, 'an Indian reservation
is considered part of the territory of the State."' Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361-62 (other citations
omitted). The Minnesota Court of Appeals cited Lone Wolf and Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S.
504 (1896), for the proposition that sovereignty is a "myth." See Granite Valley Hotel Ltd.
P'ship v. Jackpot Junction Bingo & Casino, 559 N.W.2d 135, 164-65 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
79. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 273.
80. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
81. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 288-89 ("The line of cases adjudicating Indian rights on
American soil leads to the conclusion that Indian occupancy, not specifically recognized as
ownership by action authorized by Congress, may be extinguished by the Government without
compensation.").
82. Id. at 289-90.
83. See Matthew Atkinson, Red Tape: How American Laws Ensnare Native American
Lands, Resources, and People, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 379, 382 (1998).
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disingenuously stating that, "Our conclusion does not uphold harshness as
against tenderness toward the Indians . ". . . ' Such a statement is a throwaway
line, equivalent to giving away ice in the winter.
Tee-Hit-Ton stands for the proposition that Indians and Indian tribes have no
compensable property rights in aboriginal Indian title. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Dann85 that a taking of aboriginal title
might, for all practical purposes, be taken "by operation of those courts
themselves in applying the constructive taking date adopted for one purpose in
a claims tribunal as the historical date of extinguishment of title in the law
courts. 86 In Dann, even though the Western Shoshone Tribes refused payment
through the Indian Claims Commission in exchange for its land, the Court ruled
that payment had taken place when the government placed the money in a trust
fund and that act had effectively extinguished the title.87 Tee-Hit-Ton set the bar
for extinguishments of aboriginal title very, very low, and that allowed the
government to continue to exploit tribes to its advantage.
With that type of justification underlying fundamental tenants of Federal
Indian Law, one sees Vine Deloria's justification for the argument that science
and religion are driven by assumed European biological dominance over all
races.81 If one begins to realize that Native Americans are equals and that their
culture and society rivaled and exceeded European culture at the time of first
contact,89 then fundamental principles underlying the current dominance of the
European-descended culture and government - and even "well-established"
Federal Indian Law' - starts to crumble.
The historical cases were simply awful, but the cases in the modem era
continue the trend.
84. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 290-91.
85. 470 U.S. 39 (1985).
86. John D. O'Connell, Constructive Conquest in the Courts: A Legal History of the
Western Shoshone Lands Struggle - 1861 to 1991, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 765, 798 (2002).
87. Dann, 470 U.S. at 50.
88. See generally Vine Deloria, Jr., Evolutionary Prejudice, in RED EARTH, WHITE LIES:
NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE MYTH OF SCIENTIFIC FACT 47, 47-65 (1997).
89. See generally STANNARD, supra note 20, at 52 ("[O]ther social practices of certain
native Americans in the pre-Columbian era - from methods of child rearing and codes of
friendship and loyalty, to worshipping and caring for the natural environment - appear far
more enlightened than do many of the dominant ideas we ourselves live with today.").
90. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408,434 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that an Indian tribe's power to exclude
nonmembers is "well-established") (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S.
324, 333 (1983)).
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II. Modem Cases
The modem cases, beginning with Williams v. Lee,9' suffer from a complete
lack of context in terms of the practical realities of Indian tribes at the
beginning of the era to the more recent decades. Williams v. Lee involved a
fact situation on a relatively closed reservation with an Indian-dominated
demographic outlook - the Navajo reservation - reaching the conclusion
oft-quoted by Indian tribal advocates regarding "the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."92 The Court implicitly
took into consideration the practical realities of the reservation and ruled in
favor of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribal Court over a non-
Indian.93
The Supreme Court's cases moved away from that high-water mark in large
part because the demographic reality of the Navajo Nation does not translate
to heavily allotted or disestablished reservations such as the various Sioux
reservations or the terminated tribes with little or no land base such as the
California Rancherias and the eastern tribes. The Court does not see itself
taking the side of the tribes using the relatively broad language in Williams in
the context of the Suquamish Tribe's Port Madison Reservation, for
example.94 Since the Court "generally resolves cases based on universal
principles, imposing one-size-fits-all 'solutions' to problems that have a
myriad of local wrinkles," 95 and because the Court treats Indian tribes, for
purposes of the litigation at hand, as "adversaries with irreconcilable goals,"96
the strong and reasonable (for the Navajo Nation and tribes with similar
situations) law of Williams v. Lee erodes as smaller Indian tribes bring
claims - or are forced to defend positions - the Court considers less
reasonable.
91. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
92. Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 223.
94. See discussion infra Part I.A.
95. Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and Commentary: The
Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through the Lens of Lone Wolf, 38 TULSA L. REv. 5, 11 (2002)
[hereinafter Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and Commentary].
96. Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from
Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 405, 482 (2003).
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A. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
97
Commentators, pro-Indian activists, and Indian Law practitioners started to
believe after the end of the Termination Era in 195898 that most, if not all,
Indians and Indian tribes might actually survive the trusteeship of the federal
government. In fact, tribes made progress in front of the Supreme Court and
even President Richard Nixon declared the beginning of the Self-
Determination Era in 1970, but Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe stopped
that progress dead in its tracks. Few really believed it at the time, though
hindsight seems to support that thesis.
In Oliphant, the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes do not have inherent
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, even within their reservation
boundaries.99 Mark David Oliphant, a non-Indian, assaulted a tribal police
officer and resisted arrest during the Suquamish Tribe's annual Chief Seattle
Days, " the Tribe's largest gathering of the year that takes place on the shores
of Puget Sound in the heart of the Port Madison Reservation. Naturally, the
Tribe arraigned Mr. Oliphant and intended to proceed with prosecuting him
for his crimes. Another non-Indian individual, Daniel P. Belgarde, petitioned
the Supreme Court with Mr. Oliphant. Mr. Belgarde allegedly engaged in a
high-speed automobile chase through the reservation, stopping only after
colliding with a tribal police car.' In any other jurisdiction, both men would
have been prosecuted by the appropriate state or county or municipal court,
but not in Indian Country. In fact, only about fifty Indians lived on the
reservation at that time and it makes some sense to acknowledge that the
Suquamish Tribe probably should not have been exercising criminal
97. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
98. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 180 (Rennard Strickland
et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK]. It is not clear if the Termination Era ended
in 1958 or in the early 1970s when President Richard Milhous Nixon initiated the Self-
Determination Era. Regardless, the enthusiasm of members of Congress for termination of
federal supervision, sometimes referred to as "decontrol," cannot be overstated. As late as 1957,
one Senator wrote in surely one of the purest forms of Orwellian Doublespeak: "Following in
the footsteps of the Emancipation Proclamation of ninety-four years ago, I see the following
words emblazoned in letters of fire above the heads of all Indians - THESE PEOPLE SHALL
BE FREE!' Sen. Arthur V. Watkins, Termination of Federal Supervision: The Removal of
Restrictions over Indian Property and Person, 311 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 47,
55 (1957).
99. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195.
100. Id. at 194.
101. Id.
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jurisdiction over non-Indians at that time, 0 2 but now about 2000 Indians live
on that reservation. Yet because of a "commonly shared presumption,"'0 3 the
Supreme Court held that Indian tribes could not prosecute non-Indians forever
and under every circumstance, even if the reservation demographics point to
a predominantly Indian presence." Regardless, this wide-ranging result was
a huge shock to the Suquamish Tribe and every other tribe. As soon as tribes
establish their tribal courts and seek to establish their political legitimacy and
credibility, the Supreme Court shoots them down, saying they cannot
prosecute non-Indians, no matter what the circumstances. The Court did this,
even though the federal government had long recognized that tribal "criminal
jurisdiction, no less than its civil jurisdiction, was that of any sovereign
power. ' '0 Perhaps the Justices took a poll of themselves and their clerks to
determine what the commonly held presumption was.
Numerous commentators have picked apart then-Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Oliphant for one reason or another,0 6 but the bare fact remains that
102. But see Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and Commentary, supra
note 95, at 31-32 ("[Clonsider what might have happened if the Court had allowed the tribe to
prosecute. Had fundamental unfairness occurred, a federal court, through habeas corpus, could
have remedied it."). David Wilkins wrote:
Equally puzzling is why this case with such an anomalous demographic situation
was ever taken before the Supreme Court. But even more important is the question
of why the Supreme Court, rather than recognizing the uniqueness of this case as
proposed by the Suquanish tribe's attorneys in oral arguments, used it as an
excuse to carefully set about the task of dismantling the right of all tribes to
criminally punish non-Indian offenders.
WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 42, at
213.
103. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206.
104. See generally Frickey, Doctrine, Context, InstitutionalRelationships, and Commentary,
supra note 95, at 21-22 ("Instead of denying this tribe jurisdiction because of the dreadful
[demographic] circumstances [resulting from the allotment of the Port Madison Reservation],
the Court announced a general rule: tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.").
105. Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 19, 57 (1934), reprinted in 1 U.S. DEP'T
OFTHE INTERIOR, OPINIONS OFTHE SoLIcITOR OFTHE DEPARTMENT OFTHE INTERIOR RELATING
TO INDIAN AFFAIRS 1917-1974, at 445, 447, 472 (1979) (opinion of Oct. 25, 1934). Felix S.
Cohen, who likely drafted the opinion, wrote that once the opinion "had been reviewed and
approved by the proper authorities of the Interior Department and properly mimeographed, I
learned to my dismay that all copies of the opinion in the Indian Office had been carefully
hidden away in a cabinet .... FEuX S. COHEN, Indian Self-Government, in THE LEGAL
CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OFFELIX S. COHEN 305, 307 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 1970)
[hereinafter COHEN, Indian Self-Government].
106. E.g., Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 42, at 274 (describing Oliphant as
"aberrant"); Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian
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Indian tribes cannot, after March 6, 1978, prosecute non-Indians under any
circumstances.
The human effect of this decision is substantial. Indian tribes and tribal
members know that non-Indians feel completely free to commit whatever
crimes they so desire, as long as they avoid the Major Crimes Act, 1 7 which
would possibly (but not necessarily 1"8) interest the United States Attorneys
Office.'0 9 Often, non-Indians can commit anything short of a violent crime
and get away with it in non-Public Law 280 states or Public Law 280 states
where the state has not accepted criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country. In
Oliphant, the Supreme Court created a perception of lawlessness in Indian
Country by handing down this decision that no congressional policy has ever
expressly promoted in any context. To this day, tribal police officers daily
encounter arrogant, abrasive, and angry non-Indian motorists with the opinion
and attitude that the tribal law enforcement badge is somehow worthless and
illegitimate. State and federal courts have generally upheld the authority for
tribal police officers to hold suspected lawbreakers until the "real" police
arrive," O but that does not sway the anti-Indian sentiment generated by a
single Supreme Court opinion. Even BIA officers are afflicted with this taint
of illegitimacy and accosted by motorists."'
Cases, 16 PUB. LAND L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1995) (criticizing Oliphant as creating an "unspoken
assumption" test to determine whether Congress intended tribal sovereignty to be minimized);
Russell Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REv. 60 passim (1979)
(criticizing then-Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion line-by-line).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000).
108. See generally Impact of Supreme Court Rulings on Law Enforcement in Indian
Country: Hearing Before the Comm. on Indian Affairs, United States Senate, 107th Cong. 32
(2002) (prepared statement of Hon. Darrell Hillaire, Chairman of the Lummi Nation) ("[T]he
local FBI agents recently informed their tribal law enforcement officers that resources that were
previously targeted to address organized crime on reservations are now being transferred to
address national security matters. How much of the FBI's resources that were devoted to
addressing issues in Indian country prior to September 11 are now being reallocated to address
national security interests?").
109. E.g., United States v. Cardinal, 782 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1986).
110. See, e.g., Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1180(9th Cir. 1975); Austin's
Express, Inc. v. Arneson, 996 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (D. Mont. 1998) (citing Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 n.11 (1997)); State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332, 1337 (Wash.
1993); Ryder v. State, 648 P.2d 774, 776 (N.M. 1982).
111. See United States v. Billadeau, 275 F.3d 692, 693 (8th Cir. 2001). In Billadeau, an
allegedly drunk non-Indian motorist stopped by a BIA police officer on a state highway within
the reservation drove off after the BIA officer, admitted to not being cross-deputized by the
county sheriff. Id. The Eighth Circuit held that the non-Indian was properly charged with
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Oliphant also spawned Duro v. Reina," 2 a case where the Supreme Court
held that Indian tribes could not exercise criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians. In Duro, the Court merely extended the logical reasoning
of the "commonly shared presumption" to encompass nonmember Indians." 3
In other words, once the Court announced the "commonly shared
presumption" against tribal jurisdiction, it could allow Oliphant to filter into
the prejudices and expectations of many non-Indians for a little over a decade,
and then it could announce that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians.'
1 4
After Duro, Congress enacted an amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act
to "return" criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians to Indian tribes." 5
The enactment of the remedial statute is still repeatedly under direct challenge
by nonmember Indians. One could argue that the Circuits are split on this
issue."' The Court could wipe out the whole doctrine of congressional
plenary power and effectively assume that mantle for itself. A legal concept
interfering with a federal officer engaged in the performance of his official duties.
112. 495 U.S. 676, 689 (1990).
113. Id. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. Barsh and Henderson wrote:
The ultimate danger of Oliphant is, however, to the entire judicial system. A
judicial systemcannot long maintain its authority when its written opinions appear
insincere, or the product of distortion, unreason, or sloppiness. One may well
reject our criticisms of the holding in Oliphant, even with our disapproval of the
practice of submitting social issues of such magnitude to judicial, as opposed to
legislative, judgment. We do not necessarily expect others to share our
conclusions as to good social policy in the case of tribes. Poor judicial
craftsmanship is, however, a matter that affects our society and the legal
profession as a whole, to the detriment of all.
Barsh & Henderson, The Betrayal, supra note 106, at 637.
115. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301(2) (3) (2000).
116. See United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that Indian Tribe
prosecuted Indian under delegation of congressional power), cert. granted, 2003 WL 21704146,
at *1 (Sept. 30, 2003); United States v. Long, 324 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding Indian
Tribe's inherent authority to prosecute Indians); United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.
2001) (upholding Duro fix as restoration of inherent sovereign authority of Indian tribes to
prosecute Indians); United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
Duro fix was a congressional delegation), vacated by 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 829 (1999); Means v. N. Cheyenne Tribal Court, 154 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 1998)
(treating the Duro fix as a delegation of congressional authority), overruled by Enas, 255 F.3d
at 675 n.8. See generally Pommersheim, Constitutional Crisis, supra note 45 (discussing Enas,
Weaselhead, and Means); Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and
Commentary, supra note 95, at 32 & n. 149 ("Of course, [Oliphant and Duro] are 'only' federal
common law, so Congress may alter them .... Or can it?") (citing Weaselhead and Enas).
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that has floated around for a couple centuries is the concept of inherent
sovereignty, meaning that Indian tribes were sovereign nations before the
United States Army conquered them. John Marshall gave them the name
domestic dependent nations." 7 It means that tribes retain elements of
sovereignty, such as criminal jurisdiction, that Congress has not legislated
away. The Duro fix is legislation where Congress is basically saying, "Maybe
so, but we're giving it back to them because we are empowered with plenary
power over Indian affairs."
To avoid that problem, the feds and the tribes argue that the Duro fix is not
a delegation but a sort of reaffirmation of inherent sovereign authority. The
argument seems to be that Congress wrote the statute to say that the Court got
its history wrong - tribes never lost their inherent criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians. Congress's trump card is plenary power. It can say that
the Court was wrong on the history, effectively rewriting the history the
Supreme Court wrote, which may or may not be accurate, depending on which
Justice wrote the opinion. If Congress can rewrite history with plenary power,
then the Duro fix is a reaffirmation of inherent tribal authority. If not, not." 8
Congress may think it has plenary power, but the Supreme Court actually
decides if it does or not in this instance. So who really has the plenary power?
It seems to me that it is a question of timing. Let's say Congress acted in
1988, pre-Duro, with a nonbinding resolution stating clearly that Indian tribes
retain their inherent sovereign authority to prosecute nonmember Indians. All
the resolution would be is a statement of history, but because it is Congress,
the feds and the tribes could argue that the statement of history is binding on
the Court when Duro reached it. Maybe the Court would not have gone into
a historical analysis and just rubber-stamped Congress' statement of history.
After all, congressional intent was the most critical aspect of the decision.
Only Congress can state its intent. The tribes would win. However, the Court
might have disagreed with the resolution and held that the 1988 Congress
117. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (5 Pet.) 17 (1831).
118. The question of whether Indian tribes and individual Indians should have a say when
it comes their histories and their "social contract" with the government is a question that
deserves treatment in a separate setting. In Barcelona, the Catalans said to those who would be
king, "We, who are as good as you, swear to you, who are no better than us, to accept you as
our king and sovereign lord, provided you observe all our liberties and laws - but if not, not."
ROBERT HUGHES, BARCELONA 119 (1992); see Vine Deloria, Jr., Minorities and the Social
Contract, 20 GA. L. REv. 917, 918 (1986) ("Non-political minorities have no significant
constitutional protection, nor have they ever. Insofar as they enjoy constitutional rights and
protections, their status is the result of an intense and continuing struggle for equal treatment
in the courts and legislatures of the land.").
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cannot state the intent of Congress in 1908 or 1850 or whenever. The tribes
would have lost that case.
It is the chicken and the egg problem, in part, but it is also a fundamental
problem for both Congress and the Court. All three branches have been
butchering Federal Indian Law from Day One. The Supreme Court might
actually say that it was wrong all along - Congress's plenary power was an
illusion; it never existed - in order to hold that the Duro fix was a delegation
and that Indian tribes really did lose their inherent powers to prosecute
nonmember Indians. That opens up Pandora's Box for all of Title 25. Cases
such as Morton v. Mancari"9 and Delaware Tribal Business Committee v.
Weeks 20 would be overruled by implication' 2' if not expressly.
B. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass' n
122
At least for the Rehnquist Court, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n is the closest the modem Supreme Court has come to
expressly holding that, "Our way is just better than the Indian way, that's
why."'123  Lyng lined up tribal culture and religion against an obscure,
119. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
120. 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
121. Compare DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND:
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 143-75 (2001) [hereinafter WILKINS &
LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND] (discussing "repeal by implication" in the context of Federal
Indian Law) with Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) ("In the absence of some
affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by
implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.") and United States v. Santee
Sioux Tribe of Neb., 324 F.3d 607, 611-12 (8th Cir. 2003) (construing the Johnson Act, which
prohibits certain Class H-type gaming devices, and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which
allows Class II gaming to be regulated solely by Indian tribes, to require tribes to comply with
both).
122. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
123. Vine Deloria, Jr., wrote that the Lyng decision is an "attack[] on Indian rights ... 
Vine Deloria, Jr., Trouble in High Places: Erosion of American Indian Rights to Religious
Freedom in the United States, in THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE, COLONIZATION,
AND RESISTANCE 267 (M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992) [hereinafter Deloria, Trouble in High
Places]. Deloria described Justice O'Connor's opinion as such:
The basic "threat" perceived by the high court was that of a "sudden revelation"
of sacredness to individuals, as well as the equally necessary task of recognizing
and accommodating beliefs. O'Connor seized on the most remote possibility, a
revelation at the Lincoln Memorial to one individual, and pretended that this was
comparable to the continuing religious practices of three groups of Indians which
extended back perhaps thousands of years. Her basic logical structure appeared to
be: "Socrates is a man. Socrates is insane. All men are therefore insane." Such
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unnecessary federal government road construction development (that was later
abandoned)'24 and chose the federal government over tribal culture, all in the
name of strict constructionism of the Constitution.
This case amounts to the Court's continued arrogant assertion of the
dominant culture's superiority over that of the Indians', treating Indian culture
as an assimilated subcategory of Euro-Americans culture. Commentators have
noted the incredibly disturbing aspects of the Supreme Court's position in
Lyng. 25 It should not have come as a surprise. Presaging Lyng by a few
years, one prescient commentator noted, "Indians are aware that in a balancing
test between kachinas and skiers, skiers will generally prevail as they already
have." 126 The Court in Lyng upheld the so-called G-O Road project on the
Hoopa Valley Reservation that the Ninth Circuit found would "virtually
destroy the... [Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowal Indians' ability to practice their
religion."'12
7
Lyng is classified as a First Amendment case but actually amounts to a
Supreme Court determination that native religions and beliefs, particularly
sacred places, carry very little weight in federal court and federal policy. The
shockwaves of Lyng are felt every day by Indian tribes and traditional Indians,
particularly in the Western United States. There, traditional cultures are under
constant pressure by the federal government and its constituent corporate
natural resource exploitation interests.
128
Lyng directly led to Manybeads v. United States,129 where the federal
district court of Arizona upheld the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act a° from
thinking is applicable perhaps to the netherworld inhabited by the current Supreme
Court justices, but is hardly relevant to the issue at hand.
Id. at 283.
124. See id. at 286 ("The tremendous irony of Lyng is that the road construction was later
abandoned, as it should have been, so that the case need never have been heard in its own
right.").
125. E.g., Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court's Emerging Majority: Restraining the
High Court or Transforming Its Role?, 24 AKRON L. REV. 393, 412-13 (1990).
126. John F. Petoskey, Indians andReligious Freedom, CHURCH& SOCIETY, Jan./Feb. 1985,
at 68, 76.
127. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir.
1986) (quoted in Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451) (ellipses in Supreme Court opinion; brackets added by
author).
128. See generally Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty:
A New Trust Paradigm for FederqlActions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH
L. REv. 109 (1995).
129. 730 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Ariz. 1989), aff'd, 209 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2000).
130. 25 U.S.C. §§ 640d to 640d-31 (2000).
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challenge that the forced relocation of Hopis and Navajos did not violate their
right to religious freedom. The Act partitioned land and was intended to
complete the relocation process that created the so-called Navajo-Hopi land
dispute. 1' The court did not even describe the grievances of the petitioners,
Navajo tribal members residing on the Hopi Reservation, providing in its
opinion merely a list of claims.' The court summarily rejected each of the
claims, quoting extensively from Lyng that, even if the proposed federal
project would destroy the Indian tribe's religion, "'the Constitution simply
does not provide a principle that could justify upholding respondents' legal
claims.'" 3 In a companion case, Attakai v. United States, the court upheld the
Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act despite the fact that many Navajos would
no longer be able to practice their religion after the Act's implementation.'34
The indirect progeny of Lyng is legion. For example, in Havasupai Tribe
v. United States, the court upheld a United States Forest Service plan to
approve a uranium mine near where the Havasupai practice their religion.'35
The court had the superciliousness to interpret the Indians' religion for them,
noting that, in its opinion, "The Havasupai do not necessarily have to be
present at the Canyon Mine site to practice their religion."'136 In Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States, the court upheld the United
States' actions in flooding land in the Everglades occupied by tribal
members.'37 The court interpreted Lyng as so many others have to expunge
all guilt from the federal government for destroying tribal cultures and literally
rending tribal land uninhabitable. The court merely states, in a twisted pun,
that the federal government "did not attempt to penalize any tribal members
who wished to undertake the spring corn planting ritual, nor take any action
to pressure Tribe members into giving up the rite."'
Other cases follow the lead of Lyng, even when not directly citing to the
opinion. For example, the Hoopa Valley Tribe also suffers the indignities of
its neighbors due to the Lyng decision. In an opinion issued by the Ninth
131. See generally Todd Howland, U.S. Law as a Tool Of Forced Social Change: A
Contextual Examination of the Human Rights Violations by the United States Government
Against Native Americans at Big Mountain, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 61 (1987).
132. See Manybeads, 730 F. Supp. at 1516-17.
133. Id. at 1518 (quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452).
134. 746 F. Supp. 1395, 1403-04 (D. Ariz. 1990).
135. 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1505 (D. Ariz. 1990).
136. Id. at 1485 n.8.
137. 980 F. Supp. 448,460-65 (S.D. Fla. 1997), aff'd, 163 F.3d 1359 (1 th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 810 (1999).
138. Id. at 464.
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Circuit in Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe'39 that was subsequently reversed by
an en banc panel, the court lent zero credence and respect to the highly
important cultural practices of the Hoopa Valley Tribe in favor of a slash-and-
burn logger and property owner. The court noted that since the religious
activity at issue was practiced only once every two years, it couldn't possibly
be that important and the private property ownership of the non-Indian
mattered more. 4
0
C. Hagen v. Utah14'
The Hagen Court inspected treaty and statutory language regarding the
Uintah Valley Reservation and went out of their way to find the language
unambiguous in order to reject the special canon of statutory construction
relating to Indian statutes and treaties.'42 Instead of granting deference to
remedial statutes such as the Indian Reorganization Act, the Court "resolv[ed]
every ambiguity in the statutory language, legislative history, and surrounding
circumstances in favor of the State and imputing to Congress, where no clear
evidence of congressional intent exists, an intent to diminish the Uintah
Valley Reservation."'
143
Hagen has allowed the Supreme Court and federal courts to unleash the
dogs of war on the special canon of statutory construction reserved for Indian
treaties and statutes adopted for the benefit of Indian tribes. The canon that
states ambiguous provisions in Indian treaties should be construed in favor of
the Indians made its first appearance in 1832 in Justice McLean' s concurrence
in Worchester v. Georgia." Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, listed fifteen
Supreme Court cases that had been applied to treaties in favor of Indians in the
areas of tribal water rights, hunting and fishing rights, other land rights, and
against state taxation authority. 45 The Court gave little or no weight to the
139. 229 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2000), reh'g en banc granted, 240 F.3d 1215 (9thCir. 2001),
rev'd, 266 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 927 (2002).
140. See id. at 1222 ("Simply stated, any arguable impact that cutting second-growth timber
might have upon the holding of a tribal dance once every two years, at a site some distance
away, 'has no potential to affect the health and welfare of a tribe in any way approaching the
threat inherent in impairment of the quality of the [tribe's] principal water source."') (quoting
Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998)).
141. 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 424 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
144. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring).
145. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 424 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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canon of statutory construction, citing it early in the opinion but never again
incorporating the rule favoring tribes into its analysis.'46
The death-knell (implied) of the special canon was seen in Chickasaw
Nation v. United States.'47 There, the Court stated that Congress made a
mistake in its statutory language and ruled against the Chickasaw and
Choctaw Nations rather than apply the special canon. 4 ' In other words, the
special canon is overruled. It matters not that the statute at issue, the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, is intended to benefit Indian tribes.'49 According to
the Court, congressional intent, "on balance," supported its interpretation.'
The Court gave no weight at all to the special canon.
After Hagen, Federal courts jumped on the bandwagon in reducing the
canon to meaninglessness. In Williams v. Babbitt, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the pro-tribal rule of construction, ruling instead in favor of non-Indian
reindeer herders.' 5' There, the court brushed aside the very concept behind the
canon on statutory construction and instead called into question the very
existence of Title 25, noting that Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena152
implicitly spells the end for Morton v. Moncari153 and Indian preference. '54
146. See id. at411.
147. 534 U.S. 84 (2001).
148. See id. at 89-91.
149. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2000) (declaring that the purpose of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act is to promote tribal "economic development, self-sufficiency, and
strong tribal governments").
150. Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 91.
151. 115 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cit. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Kawerak Reindeer Herders
Ass'n v. Williams, 523 U.S. 1117 (1998).
152. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
153. 417 U.S. 535 (1974). But see U.S. Air Tour Ass'n v. FAA, 298 F.3d 997, 1012 n.8
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that the Court would not treat Morton as overruled until the Supreme
Court expressly does so) (citing Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 158
F.3d 1335, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
154. Williams, 115 F.3d at 665. Other courts have read the Williams dicta narrowly. The
California Court of Appeals wrote, "We believe that Judge Kozinski's provocative dicta, when
considered in context, can best be understood as casting constitutional doubt on Indian-run
gaming monopolies formed solely for business purposes untethered to any declared federal
objective of strengthening tribal self government or promoting the tribe's economic
development." Flynt v. Cal. Gambling Control Comm'n, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 167, 182 (2002);
see also Artichoke Joe's v. Norton, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1127 n.56 (E.D. Cal. 2002)
("Although the Secretary's interpretation of IGRA raises a constitutional question, it is not
sufficiently serious to require a different reading of the statute.") (citing Williams, 115 F.3d at
662 and Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)).
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It no longer matters that Congress passed the Reindeer Industry Act. 5 "to give
natives a big leg up in the business."' 5 6
Another aspect of Hagen was that the Supreme Court strongly implied that
Indian tribes are an anachronism, that their reservation boundaries are utterly
meaningless. The Court cited demographic information in their attempt to
inject their version of reality into Indian tribes, stating that the Uintah Indians
living on their own reservation were only fifteen percent of the population.'57
The fact that relatively few Indians lived within the reservation boundaries,
the Court concluded that congressional intent to diminish the reservation was
properly satisfied, thereby proving that the Court's statutory analysis was
correct.'58 By the same reasoning, the Court could conclude that since
Congress intended to assimilate or destroy all Indians and Indian tribes during
allotment and that they nearly succeeded because few Indians remained alive,
Congress actually did eliminate Indian tribes and they no longer constitute a
substantial body of political entities. For several members of the Supreme
Court, possibly as many as four, Indian tribes should not exist as political
sovereigns at all.
While the Supreme Court has not said it yet, state court judges around the
United States say that Indian tribes are completely illegitimate all the time.
It was not very long ago that the Chief Judge of the Washington State
Supreme Court wrote:
The view that an incorporated Indian tribe possesses any
attributes of sovereignty whatever and that its members are citizens
of the nation, the state, and have a kind of tribal citizenship too, is,
therefore, a manifest absurdity for it rests on the ludicrous premise
that an exclusive group having a preordained and common
bloodline and of a predetermined race may possess powers of
government and have special rights in state and national resources
not available to all other national, state and local governmental
entities. It is an erroneous premise necessarily acknowledging that
a political entity or subdivision dependent for its existence solely
on race and ancestry may, under the constitution, possess some
degree of sovereignty independent of the state and the nation.'59
155. 25 U.S.C. §§ 500-500n (2000).
156. Williams, 115 F.3d at 659.
157. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 421 (citation omitted).
158. Id.
159. Anderson v. O'Brien, 524 P.2d 390, 399 (Wash. 1974) (Hale, C.J., dissenting).
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Another state court judge, this time in Minnesota a mere six or seven years
ago, quoted an anti-Indian author for the proposition that Indian tribes stopped
being sovereign in 1871 when Congress stopped ratifying Indian treaties.
160
The judge emphasized that the idea that Indian tribes were ever sovereign is
a "ridiculous pretense."'' The Hagen decision rests the context of criminal
jurisdiction, but other contexts are implicated by the Supreme Court's
skepticism that tribes located within allotted reservations are otherwise
opened up to the public domain, such as the Clean Water Act and the Clean
Air Act jurisdiction, the reach of state taxation authority, and treaty hunting
and fishing rights. Just as important as the black letter rights of Indians and
Indian tribes are preserved reservation boundaries.
Imagine tribal leaders from 1855, say Aghosa and Eshquagonabe, head men
of the Ottawa bands that lived and gathered around the Grand Traverse Bay
in what is now called Michigan. Imagine those leaders writing to a federal
agent, asking him to allow members of the Grand Traverse Band to remain in
the bay area. They wrote: "We feel such an attachment to this our native
place, from whence we derive our birth, that it looks like certain death to go
from it....,, 1 62 Now imagine those same men and leaders of tribes during the
removal age who signed sacred documents that they thought would preserve
their people and small portions of their land forever watching seven men and
two women who have never set foot on the reservation or met any of their
descendants deciding that the sacred document is of no value, that the
reservation is described by nothing more than the adjective "disestablished,"
and that the treaties they signed have been broken repeatedly with no remedy.
The finding of a diminished reservation hurts Indian tribes in more ways as
well. In Wisconsin v. Stockbridge-Munsee Community, the court held that a
finding of a diminished reservation adversely affects the Tribe's ability to
operate Class I gaming. 63 Even more crucially, in Michigan v. EPA, the
D.C. Circuit held that the EPA could not approve applications by Indian tribes
to operate Clean Air Act programs on land where "Indian Country" status was
in question." This means that Indian tribes without litigated reservation
boundaries cannot operate many environmental programs. It also means that
160. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000).
161. Cohen v. Little Six, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 376, 382 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (Randall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting RALPH K. ANDRIST, THE LONG DEATH: THE LAST DAYS OF THE PLAINS
INDIANS 246 (1993)), affd, 561 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. 1997).
162. Letter from Peter Dougherty to Daniel Wells (Feb. 6, 1841) (on file with author).
163. 67 F. Supp. 2d 990, 1019-20 (E.D. Wis. 1999).
164. 268 F.3d 1075, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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those tribes cannot exercise their jurisdiction for the general welfare of their
people to improve the environment on the reservation. In effect,
disestablishment not only removes the opportunity for tribes to establish their
governmental presence but also precludes tribes from reacting to States (like
Michigan) that have gone far to reduce environmental protections in favor of
smokestack industries and other polluters.m65
D. Montana v. United States"6
Montana is now a "pathmarking case," according to the Supreme Court.'67
It was not declared a "pathmarking case" until 1997, sixteen years after its
1981 genesis. Montana seems to be a convenient case for the Supreme Court
to rely upon in its quest to eradicate an Indian tribe's ability to govern within
its own reservation boundaries. Montana and its progeny have been
thoroughly researched and commented upon by many academics and
commentators, few of whom seem to think that Montana should mean what
it does to the Court. 168
Montana went through a few road bumps on its way to being the most
feared Supreme Court case in Indian Country. First there was National
165. See WINONA LADUKE, ALL OUR RELATIONS: NATIVE STRUGGLES FOR LAND AND LIFE
2 (1999) ("According to the Worldwatch Institute, 317 reservations in the United States are
threatened by environmental hazards, ranging from toxic wastes to clearcuts."). LaDuke largely
blames corporate greed for the threat to Indians:
The preamble of the U.S. Constitution declares its intent to "secure the blessings
of liberty, to ourselves, and our posterity." In reality, U.S. laws have been
transformed by corporate interests to cater to elite interests in society. While the
U.S. Constitution makes no mention of corporations . . . , the history of
Constitutional law is, as former Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter said, "the
history of the impact of the modem corporation on the American scene." Over the
course of two centuries of court decisions, corporate contracts and their rates of
return have been redefined as property that should be protected under the
Constitution. In this way the "common good" has been redefined as "maximum
corporate production and profit."
Id. at 198-99 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
166. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
167. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
168. See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case At A Time: Judicial
Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1255-56 (2001) (arguing that
Montana did not have the impact it does now until Strate declared it a "pathmarking" case).
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Farmers169 and Iowa Mutual,70 then Brendale17 1 and then Bourland, 112 but the
Montana doctrine came to full maturity with the Supreme Court's opinion in
Strate v. A-1 Contractors.
173
Under a basic conflict of laws analysis, if a tort occurs between a citizen of
the state of Michigan and a citizen of the state of Alaska in Ann Arbor and the
Michigan victim sues in Washtenaw County Circuit Court, the Michigan court
undergoes an analysis involving significant contacts with the state to
determine whether Michigan's long-arm statute would compel the Alaskan
defendant to appear and face the suit. If, for example, the Alaskan defendant
owned land within the state of Michigan or perhaps had several family
members in Michigan and typically spent several months a year in Michigan,
the Michigan court would have jurisdiction over the defendant from Alaska.
Even more importantly, if the Alaskan defendant had conducted the tort in the
course of conducting business with the Michigan plaintiff, then definitely the
Michigan court would have jurisdiction over the Alaskan.
Not so in Indian Country, according to the Supreme Court. In Indian
Country, a person who is married to an Indian, has Indian children, and lives
on the reservation and sues a company that regularly conducts business on the
reservation and commits the tort while conducting business on the reservation
has no recourse in the court with jurisdiction over that reservation. Why?
Because maybe the specific parcel of land within the reservation has a right-
of-way over it controlled and maintained by the state.' 74 Because the
defendant does not vote in that reservation. 7 ' Because the defendant could
not serve on ajury in that reservation. 17 6 Because the defendant is unfamiliar
169. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (holding
that litigants must exhaust their tribal court remedies prior to seeking federal court review of
tribal court jurisdiction).
170. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (holding that federal diversity
jurisdiction does not allow litigant to avoid exhaustion of tribal court remedies).
171. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989) (holding that Indian tribes could not zone land within their own reservations that were
opened to the public for settlement).
172. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (holding that Indian tribe could not
exercise its inherent authority over non-Indian hunting and fishing on land taken for reservoir
and darn project).
173. Strate, 520 U.S. at 438.
174. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied sub nom. Estates of Red Wolf & Bull Tail v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 529 U.S. 1110
(2000).
175. Cf. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990).
176. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 n.4 (1978).
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with the court procedures of the local tribal court. 17 7 All of these factors are
present when an Ohio resident sets foot inside Michigan.
Strate takes away the right of Indian tribes to deal with civil conflicts that
occur on their respective reservation. Strate takes the concept of self-
determination that has been the paradigm of congressional Indian policy since
1970,178 perverts it, twists it, and reverses it.
Strate immediately spawned cases such as Wilson v. Marchington,7 9 Boxx
v. Long Warrior,80 Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Red Wolf,'8' and
Ford Motor Co. v. Todocheene.5 2 These cases uniformly reject the relatively
benign concept that Indian tribes and their tribal courts can adjudicate civil
disputes within their own reservation. Wilson, Boxx, and Red Wolf are not
exactly like Strate, in which the Supreme Court emphasized the non-Indian
character of both parties. These three cases involve individual Indians trying
to seek a civil remedy in their own court of law, their tribe's own self-
determined forum for adjudicating disputes. In all these cases, the federal
courts followed Strate's lead. Tribal self-determination and sovereignty takes
a back seat whenever non-Indians are involved. For the Supreme Court, tribal
courts are the equivalent of tvjustice. In the eyes of the Supreme Court, tribal
judges are the equivalent of Judge Wapner, Judge Judy, and probably a touch
of Springer thrown in to complete their impression of the savage, mob-style
justice handed down in tribal courts.'83 Indian families who suffer wrongful
deaths at the hands of multinational corporate conglomerates who do business
of their own free will on Indian reservations must suffer the indignity of not
177. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 459; Boxx v. Long Warrior, 265 F.3d 771,778 (9th Cir. 2001).
178. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 98, at 185-86.
179. 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
180. 265 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 2001).
181. 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2000).
182. 221 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2002); see also Tribal Court Can't Hear Tribal Cop
Case, INDIANZ.COM, Nov. 1, 2002, available at http://www.indianz.com/News/show.asp?
ID=2002/1 1/01/court (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
183. Cf Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) ("Although
some modem tribal courts 'mirror American courts' and 'are guided by written codes, rules,
procedures, and guidelines,' tribal law is still frequently unwritten, being based instead 'on the
values, mores, and norms of a tribe and expressed in its customs, traditions, and practices,' and
is often 'handed down orally or by example from one generation to another."') (quoting Ada
Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society, 79 JUDICATURE 126, 130-31
(1995)). One attorney characterized Justice Souter's opinion in Hicks as saying, "[W]e don't
trust these tribal courts; who are they?; and we are not about to send non-Indians in there."
Martha Vasquez et al., Current Issues in Native American Law, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 249, 263
(2003) (quoting Samuel Winder).
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having a forum to help remedy their injuries in their own court systems.
Strate and its progeny also imply' that tribal governments are not real
governments. Montana's second exception states that tribes will have civil
regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers when their
activities affect the tribe's ability to govern itself and provide for the general
welfare of its members."s In these cases, the Supreme Court's decision has
virtually eradicated the exceptions, not by overruling Montana, but by saying
that the tribe's ability to govern itself and provide for its members general
welfare is totally subservient to non-Indians' comfort levels in court. Tribes'
attempts to regulate highway safety and save tribal members lives is
subservient to non-Indians' comfort levels in court. Tribes' attempts to
establish themselves as stable and internationally respected governing bodies
is also subservient to non-Indians' comfort levels in court. Indian tribes
cannot even authorize their tribal police to ticket non-Indians who drive like
maniacs on the reservation because their concerns for their tribal members is
subservient to non-Indians' comfort levels in court. One commentator argued
that the post-Strate jurisprudence is "legally (and politically) destabilizing to
tribal courts and creates a genuine crisis of federal legitimacy." '185
The plaintiffs in Red Wolf argued that the Tribe's interest was to prevent
the deaths of potential or actual "council members, teachers and
babysitters,"' 86 but to allow the Tribe to govern itself to save lives would
result in "severely shrink[ing] the [Montana] rule"' 87 protecting non-Indians
from the perceived horrors of tribal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has
weighed what it considers important as to Indian Country and the actual
Indians who reside there, who are stubbornly refusing to go extinct, still finish
last.
Another place the Supreme Court, after Strate, has taken Indian tribes is to
allow federal courts and exploitative non-Indian corporations to make a
mockery of Indian culture and Indian families, specifically the descendants of
Crazy Horse. In Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, the Eighth
Circuit stated that a large corporate body that conducted business on the
Rosebud Sioux Reservation and exploited, manipulated, and took advantage
of the good name of a famous Indian leader to sell malt liquor to depressed,
poor, underprivileged, inner city minorities (not to mention Indians) could not
184. See Montana v. United States, U.S. 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
185. Frank Pomnmersheim, Coyote Paradox: Some Indian Law Reflections from the Edge of
the Prairie, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 439, 463 (1999).
186. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d at 1065.
187. Id. (quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 458).
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validly be sued in tribal court.'88 One commentator stated, "[T]he name of
Crazy Horse is just another resource [for multinational corporations] to invest
in, like coal and timber. But this time, it is not native land that is being
stripped away, but native culture and spirit."'89 Here, the Supreme Court has
weighed Indian lives and Indian dignity against the privilege of a corporation
(a legal fiction) to exploit Indian culture and, once again, the Indians finish
last.
In Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. Assiniboine and Sioux
Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation, a Ninth Circuit panel remanded a case for
discovery on the issue of whether a tribe could ever show that non-Indian
activity could affect the integrity of an Indian tribe's government. In a
concurrence, one judge stated:
[f]or if the trains crossing a tribe's reservation carry toxic or
dangerous chemicals, nuclear waste, biological dangers, or other
threats to the reservation, then the tribe has a right to know what
company it keeps, and then to assess whether any taxing strategy
could fairly cover the tribe's protective costs. 90
E. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida9'
In Seminole Tribe, Indian tribes became victims of circumstance as they
became enmeshed in the jurisdictional war between the federal government
and the Supreme Court over states' rights.'92 In states where the tribe and the
state government had not yet entered into a Class Ill gaming compact,
Seminole Tribe practically constituted an overruling of California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians,'93 which established that Indian tribes may engage
in gaming not completely prohibited by state law 94 and that states cannot
regulate that gaming. 9 5 The Seminole Tribe Court held that Congress lacked
188. 133 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (8th Cir. 1998).
189. Wenona T. Singel, Cultural Genocide?: The Impact of Crazy Horse Malt Liquor,
NATIVE VOICES, Winter/Spring 1994, at 2, 2 (on file with author).
190. 323 F.3d 767, 775-76 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, C.J., concurring).
191. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
192. See generally Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court's Use of The Implicit Divestiture
Doctrine to Implement Its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in Indian Country, 36 TuLSA L.J. 267
(2000).
193. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
194. See id. at 211-12.
195. See id. at 213-14.
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authority to force states into federal court if sued by Indian tribes for failure
to negotiate Class II gaming compacts in good faith.'9 6
Gaming constitutes the best bet for economic development for many Indian
tribes, allowing tribes revenue to provide housing, health care, jobs, and other
innumerable social services, and helping to impart political integrity and
stability for tribal government,'97 just as contemplated by the congressional
annunciation of policy behind the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.'98
Seminole Tribe could have stopped Indian gaming in its tracks.
Immediately after the Court announced its decision, many states stopped
negotiating at all with Indian tribes' 99 and many tribes had no choice but to
offer monetary, jurisdictional, and other concessions to states in order to
negotiate Class M compacts.
The Supreme Court's reverence for the Eleventh Amendment affects tribes
and tribal members in many more ways than gaming compact negotiations.
In Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes
could not force States into federal court to litigate land claims.2"' In
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, the Supreme Court held that Indian
tribes could not force States into federal court to litigate an alleged violation
of equal protection laws by a particular State.2"' In Nevada v. Hicks, 2 2 the
Supreme Court held that State officials may not be sued in accordance with
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in tribal courts.0 3 Another recent case, Inyo County v.
Paiute-Shoshone Indians of Bishop Community of Bishop Colony,2°4 afforded
196. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76.
197. See Letter fromTex G. Hall, President, National Congress of American Indians, to Time
Magazine Editorial Staff 1 (Dec. 13, 2002) (on file with author) ("Indian gaming has provided
one very important mechanism for providing jobs and economic activity in a number of tribal
communities where no other option has been available to address the extreme conditions of
poverty and unemployment that exist.").
198. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1998);
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 131 F.3d 1379 (10th Cir. 1997); Jicarilla Apache
Tribe v. Kelly, 129 F.3d 535 (10th Cir. 1997); Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb. v. Nebraska, 121
F.3d 427 (8th Cir. 1997). Even prior to Seminole Tribe, stubborn states refused to negotiate
with Indian tribes. See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 5 F.3d 147
(6th Cir. 1993).
200. 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997).
201. 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991).
202. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
203. Id. at 369. See generally id. at 397-402 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the
case should have been decided as a matter of state immunity).
204. 123 S. Ct. 1887 (2003).
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the Supreme Court the opportunity to shield the States from liability."0 5
Eleventh Amendment immunity requires tribes to seek redress against state
actors in state courts, a forum the Supreme Court's own favorite cases
acknowledge are inherently and often expressly biased against tribal parties.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court conceded that
states are Indian tribes' greatest enemy. 06 By the 1970s, according to the
Supreme Court, there was nothing wrong with state courts adjudicating Indian
claims any longer,20 7 but only a few years later, Congress found, in passing the
Indian Child Welfare Act, that states (and their courts) were responsible for
continuing to take Indian children away from their families and were generally
uninterested in respecting tribal custom and tradition.2 8 The Supreme Court
continues to insist, in spite of a plethora of learned opinion to the contrary,20 9
205. See id. at 1892-94.
206. See Kagama v. United States, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
207. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,812
(1976). There the Court wrote:
The Government argues that because of its fiduciary responsibility to protect
Indian rights, any state-court jurisdiction over Indian property should not be
recognized unless expressly conferred by Congress. It has been recognized,
however, that an action for the destruction of personal property may be brought
against an Indian tribe where "(a)uthority to sue... is implied." Moreover, the
Government's argument rests on the incorrect assumption that consent to state
jurisdiction for the purpose of determining water rights imperils those rights or in
some way breaches the special obligation of the Federal Government to protect
Indians. Mere subjection of Indian rights to legal challenge in state court,
however, would no more imperil those rights than would a suit brought by the
Government in district court for their declaration, a suit which, absent the consent
of the Amendment, would eventually be necessitated to resolve conflicting claims
to a scarce resource. The Government has not abdicated any responsibility fully
to defend Indian rights in state court, and Indian interests may be satisfactorily
protected under regimes of state law.
Id. (quoting Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919)).
208. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2000).
209. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 313 n.ll (1997)
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("And when the plaintiff suing the state officers has been an Indian tribe,
the readiness of the state courts to vindicate the federal right has been less than perfect.");
Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 704 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[T]he federal
government is a more trustworthy guardian of Indian interests than the states ...."); Native
Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 553-54 (9th Cir. 1991) ("It would
thus be ironic indeed if Congress then permitted only state courts, never believed by Congress
to be the historical defenders of tribal interests, to determine the scope of tribal authority under
the Act.") (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5)); Carl H. Johnson, A Comity of Errors: Why John v.
Baker Is Only a Tentative First Step in the Right Direction, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 42 (2001)
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that state courts are adequate to protect tribal interests.
Il. The Discovery' of the Fountain of Youth2 ' and the Slippery Slope of
Self-Reliance - An Anishinaabek"2 Fable
A few years from now, imagine that, in the early spring, a little five-year-
old boy named Niko Roberts, one of the newest members of the Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, stumbles across a small pond
in between two hills while wandering around in the hilly woods in
Peshawbestown, Michigan. The pond is shallow and the area around it is
covered in dense weeds. Niko is captivated by the water's surface, which
appears to sparkle radiantly. He also notices the very colorful underbrush
surrounding the small pond. Niko is a very smart boy - he taught himself to
read at age four - and quickly understands that there is something very
special about this particular pond. In early spring on that portion of the Grand
Traverse Reservation, just north of the forty-fifth parallel, there are not yet
bright colors populating the woodsy floor, yet this pool appears to be fueling
a dramatic outburst of voluptuous affectation in the immediate flora. Niko
files his discovery away for future revelation to his grandmother.
("[R]ecognition of federal supremacy on this issue is important as state courts frequently
misconstrue the nature and origin of tribal sovereignty.").
210. "It should be added that the English and Dutch are still quarreling about who
discovered Africa even though the continent could be seen by the Spanish across the Straits of
Gibraltar, not to speak of by its own millions of citizens." Jim Harrison, Introduction, in
GEORGE WEEKS, MEM-KE-WEH: DAWNING OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND
CHIPPEWA INDIANS ix (1992).
211. The author takes heart in the words of the Second District of the California Court of
Appeals, which wrote in 1951:
The mythical fountain of youth and the effect of its waters have been the subject
of writers for hundreds of years. Ponce de Leon was in search of the fountain
when the [sic] discovered Florida. Other explorers were equally optimistic in their
search and equally unsuccessful. The fabulous Isle of Bimini was supposed by
some to be the location of the youth preserving waters; others placed it in the heart
of Africa. The fact that the legendary lost continent, Atlantis, Bimini and the
fountain of youth have long been the subjects of folklore, song and story in many
languages does not foreclose a modem writer from using the same situations and
locales for the purpose of symbolization or for the manifestation of his
imagination.
Weitzenkom v. Lesser, 231 P.2d 889, 893 (Cal. App. 1951) (Wilson, J., concurring), vacated
on other grounds, 256 P.2d 947 (1953).
212. People of the Three Fires - Odawa, Potawatomi, and Ojibwe. See generally BASIL
JOHNSTON, OJIBWAY CEREMONIES 6 (1982) (describing the Anishinaabe people as "people of
good intentions").
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Of course, being the eternal child of the moment, Niko does not mention
the pool to his Gramma for a full week. Niko's Gramma calls her favorite
council member and dutifully reports that her grandson has found an
interesting pond behind the tribal administration buildings and puts the chain
of events in motion. Two weeks after Niko's discovery, Radica Morris and
Ben Fatto, two tribal biologists from the Conservation Department, take a
walk out to the pool to satisfy their curiosity. For decades, Peshawbestown
residents have been walking around in the woods behind the area where the
tribal government's buildings are located, blazing walking paths and trails.
It would surprise both of the biologists, both of whom fancied themselves
amateur geologists, to find a substantial, yet undiscovered, pool of water back
there. The early and vibrant vegetation they find, as well as a few very bulky
deer, shock them.
They return to the Conservation Department office, affectionately known
as the Fish Office, where they conduct a few chemical tests on the water in the
pool to ensure that there are no serious water pollution concerns. They notice
the wild plant growth, which is weeks ahead of schedule, and suspect some
form of phosphorus contamination or another chemical plant growth
conductor. Neither biologist is an expert in miracles, but the tests indicate that
the water in that pool is something special. After concluding the water in the
shallow pool is safe, both take a test sip. Radica, the younger of the two
biologists and a devoted sun worshipper, immediately notices the
disappearance of the annoying brown moles on her arms. Ben, much older
than Radica, instantly feels twenty years younger after trying a glass of the
special water. Imagining themselves to be the guest stars in a very special
episode of the X-Files, the two biologists choose to keep a tight lid on their
experiences. They are wise because they have discovered the Fountain of
Youth, upgraded to "legendary" from "mythical" as it turns out to be real after
all.
At the end of the month, the Grand Traverse Band Tribal Council meets in
an emergency session to decide on how to proceed. The seven council
members sit and debate their various alternatives for several hours. Upon
being asked, the General Counsel, Toledo Vader, for the Band, advises his
clients that the pool is located on trust land held by the Department of Interior
for the benefit of the Band and they can do with it whatever they please. He
immediately wonders if he will regret his determination at a later date or if by
showing up to work that day he has "step[ped] on some kind of political
landmine."2 3 One council member sees dollar signs and envisions the pool
213. Robert B. Porter, A Seneca Indian in King Arthur's Law School: Observations Along
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as a major tourist destination surpassing Lourdes and Orlando combined.
Another council member, a devout Catholic, also believes that the pool is
more powerful than any previous miracle since the time of Jesus Christ, but
recommends that the Council build a cathedral to guard the pool from ne' er-
do-wells and do only the Lord's work. A third council member believes the
pool to represent the coming of The New People and the end of 500-plus years
of domination at the hands of the Europeans. 2 4 A fourth council member
would like to see the pool as a purely tribal resource, available only to
members of the Grand Traverse Band and jealously guarded to preserve the
Band and its people, but also acknowledges that the existence of the pool
could never be kept a secret for long.
Toledo knows the council members well because he has practically grown
up with many of them in Peshawbestown and Harbor Springs and Cross
Village. He knows that the majority of the council members see dollar signs
because dollar signs mean per capita payments and increased funding for
governmental services like housing and health care and law enforcement; all
of those things mean re-election. Yet Toledo knows that vast influxes of cash
inevitably create unforeseeable results for any organization. During a break
in the debate, Toledo returns to his office to relax and sees four phone
messages - two from a reporter at the Traverse City Record-Eagle, one from
a reporter at the Leelanau Enterprise, and one from a reporter at the Detroit
News. He now knows that the pool is no longer a secret on the Grand
Traverse Reservation - the story is out. He does not return the calls.
When the council members return from the break twenty-five minutes later,
Toledo sees in their eyes that at least two of them have returned phone calls
back to reporters, probably the same reporters that left messages for him. He
also knows that when the Council breaks, it means the debate is over and they
have made up their minds. Within ten minutes, Toledo is on his laptop
drafting a resolution approving the Band's privatization (or perhaps
collectivization) of the pool. The Council, voting 6-1, compels Toledo to
name the resolution, "The Anishinaabek Fountain of Youth Self-Reliance2t 5
Ordinance." The new law adopts the proposal offered by the first council
the Journey, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 529, 532 (2002).
214. EDWARD BENTON-BANAI, THE MISHOMIS BOOK 111 (1979) ("The prophet of the
Seventh fire of the Ojibwe spoke of an Osh-ki-bi-ma-di-zeeg (New People) that would emerge
to retrace their steps to find what was left by the trail.").
215. Cf. McCarthy, supra note 40.
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member and orders the Band's Economic Development Corporation 216 to open
the pool up for business.
Within a week, the line of cars waiting in line to have a sip of the water
from the Fountain of Youth stretches for miles south down M-22 all the way
to Traverse City and north for miles up M-22, through Northport, and then
back down south as far as Leland. Long-time Peshawbestown locals say they
haven't seen anything like it since the days when the Band opened up its first
high-stakes bingo hall in 1984 and then a modest casino in 1985.217 Tribal and
Leelanau County law enforcement officials are overwhelmed by the massive
influx of automobiles and people into the lightly populated county.
Meanwhile, the governor of Michigan, embroiled like so many other state
governors in a terrible budget crunch, personally calls the Tribal Council
Chair, Wendy Singleton, to talk about the State's needs and to ask if the Band
would do anything to help out, especially considering that the Band's new
attraction has strained local government services well beyond the breaking
point. Wendy reminds the governor that the Band already contributes more
than its share to local governments in accordance with terms of the gaming
218compact. In not so subtle phrasing, the governor talks about reopening the
lawsuit that seven Michigan tribes and the state settled in order to agree over
Class I gaming compacts." 9
"But this has nothing to do with gaming," Wendy says.
"Madam Chair, don't be greedy," the governor says. "No one wins if the
state and local governments have to shut down services to the Band.
220
216. See 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2000); 15 GRAND TRAVERSE BAND CODE §§ 201-268 (2002)
(GTB Economic Development Corporation - Federal Charter of Incorporation).
217. See United States v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 692 F. Supp. 777, 778-79 (W.D Mich.
1988) (noting that four Michigan Indian tribes, including the Grand Traverse Band, operated
casinos at that time), vacated, 727 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
218. See, e.g., Gaming Revenue to Benefit 53 Causes, TRAVERSE CITY (MICH.) RECORD-
EAGLE, Feb. 6, 2003 ("The Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians will
distribute more than $1.1 million to area schools, governments and other organizations as part
of its semianuual grant awards reflecting 2 percent of its electronic gaming revenue."), available
at http:/lwww.record-eagle.com/2003/feb/O6tribe.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
219. Consent Judgment, Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, No. 1:90 CV
611 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 1993) (on file with author); see also Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of
Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 93 F. Supp. 2d 850, 855 (W.D. Mich. 2000), aft'd, 271 F.3d 235
(6th Cir. 2001).
220. See generally Chase v. McMasters, 573 F.2d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir.) (holding that
municipality could be liable for damages under § 1983 for withdrawing public services to Indian
Tribe and its members); Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 226-27 (N.D. N.Y. 1979)
(holding that Indian Tribe and its members could sue municipality and municipal employees
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The next day, a tribal court clerk serves Toledo with a notice that a large
group of Grand Traverse Band members, dissatisfied with the Tribal Council's
decision to open up the reservation to so many non-Indians and, particularly,
the Council's decision to exploit the miraculous natural resource of the pool
for its economic potential, has filed suit in tribal court to close down the
EDC's operation. Toledo, knowing that the tribal court will likely treat the
question as a nonjusticiable political question,"' assigns the case to his Staff
Attorney, an eager attorney just out of law school. Toledo is more worried
about the possibility that the lawsuit is a precursor to a wave of litigation.
And Toledo's anxiety is justified because a week later, he is served with
two federal suits seeking to enjoin the EDC operation. The first is from a
group of "concerned taxpayers" that allege the Band is taking advantage of
Leelanau and Grand Traverse Counties because of the Band's state tax
exemption. The second is from a group of property owners222 that have
detested the Band from its recognition in 1980. They throw the kitchen sink
at the Band. They claim the Bureau of Indian Affairs abused its discretion in
recognizing the Band in 1980. They claim the Band is not really the successor
in interest to the Grand Traverse Band that signed the 1836223 and 1855224
treaties.225  They claim that the Grand Traverse Reservation was
under § 1983 for damages sustained when municipality withdrew public services); Comment,
Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1834,70 MICH. L. REv. 955,980
(1972) ("The states may not continue to tolerate a situation that may require them to perform
[education and welfare] services and at the same time forces them to recognize the special status
that may free tribes from state taxation and such controls as conservation regulations.")
(footnotes and citations omitted).
221. See generally Tribal Members Advocacy Group v. Tribal Council, No. 95-03-008-CV,
at 2 (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Court, Apr. 13, 1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to
expound upon any of the policy or political implications of this disputed sale of land owned by
the tribe.") (on file with author).
222. See, e.g., FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A
POLITICAL ANOMALY 425 (1994) (identifying the "United Property Owners of Washington
(UPOW)" as an anti-Indian treaty rights organization).
223. Indian Treaty Chippewas, Mar. 28, 1836, 7 Stat. 491.
224. Indian Treaty Chippewas, July 31, 1855, 11 Stat. 621.
225. See, e.g., Ass'n of Property Owners/Residents of Port Madison Area (APORPMA) v.
Suquamish Tribe, No. COI-5317FDB (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2002) (on file with author)
[hereinafter APORPMA] (dismissing claim for lack of standing that Suquamish Tribe was not
successor in interest to Indians that signed Treaty of Point Elliott), aftd, 2003 WL 22098043
(9th Cir., Sept. 9, 2003); United States v. Aam, 670 F. Supp. 306, 308-09 (W.D. Wash. 1986)
(holding that Suquamish Tribe was successor interest to Indians that signed Treaty of Point
Elliott).
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disestablished 26 and that the Band has been exercising civil regulatory and
adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-Indians in violation of federal law.227 They
sue the federal government under § 1983 for allowing the Band to operate as
a sovereign government and they sue the individual council members for
violating their civil rights.22 They sue the feds for taking the land into trust
arbitrarily and capriciously.22 9
Before Toledo can finish reading the 177-page complaint from the property
owners, he receives a call from the Environmental Protection Agency. The
regional EPA office has always treated the Band and the other Michigan tribes
fairly, especially considering many of the Michigan tribes do not have
litigated reservation boundaries.23° But the regional administrator believes
that the Band must comply with the Safe Drinking Water Act23 and
regulations implementing the Clean Water Act because the EPA has
jurisdiction over Indian Country.232 Due to the fact that no one else has ever
226. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty., 67 F. Supp. 2d 990, 1019 (E.D.
Wis. 1999) (holding that the state maintains a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that
the Stockbridge-Munsee Reservation was disestablished).
227. See, e.g., County of Mille Lacs v. Benjamin, 262 F. Supp. 2d 990,996 (D. Minn. 2003)
(citing APORPMA, supra note 225, at 4, and Brown-Outagamie-Oneida Jurisdiction
Commission v. Powless, No. 85-C-1052 (E.D. Wis., Sept. 28, 1990)).
228. See, e.g., APORPMA, supra note 225, at 1-2.
229. See, e.g., Lincoln City v. United States Dep't of Interior, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1123-
26 (D. Or. 2002) (discussing claims that the Department of Interior acted arbitrarily and
capriciously by taking lands into trust for the benefit of Indian Tribe); Sault Ste. Marie, Mich.
v. Andrus, 458 F. Supp. 465, 468 (D. D.C. 1978) (holding that city had standing to challenge
decision of Secretary of the Interior to take land into trust for the benefit of Indian Tribe); cf.
TOMAC v. Norton, 193 F. Supp. 2d 182, 191-92 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that Act that restored
the federal recognition to the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians and required the Secretary
to take land into trust for the benefit of the Band did not violate the Nondelegation Doctrine).
230. Compare Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that EPA lacks
authority to administer Clean Air Act permitting program where Indian country status is in
question), with Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Michigan, 784 F. Supp. 418 (W.D. Mich. 1991)
(declaring the borders of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Reservation to be extant). See generally
John F. Petoskey, Doing Business With Michigan Indian Tribes, 76 MICH. B.J. 440,445 n. 16
(1997):
The exterior boundaries of the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, the
Bay Mills Indian Community, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa
Indians, the Little Traverse Bay Band of Odawa Indians and the Little River Band
of Ottawa Indians have not been subject to "exterior boundaries" litigation ....
Presumably, the boundaries still exist as defined in the original treaties.
Id. (citations omitted).
231. 40 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2000).
232. See HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224, 1244-48 (10th Cir. 2000).
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discovered a naturally occurring fountain of youth before, the EPA will have
no choice but to ask the Band to close the EDC's operation until it can be
studied. Toledo says he understands and informs the administrator that the
Tribal Council has no choice but to fight the EPA on that ground.
That day, Tribal Council, in a 4-3 vote, decides from a business standpoint
to continue operating the pool enterprise until the federal or tribal court orders
it shut down. The EDC operation is generating over $4 million per day and
runs twenty-four hours a day. The Council hires expensive geologists and
biologists to prove that the water is perfectly clean (in fact, it is the perfect
water) and that it is not connected to the water table in any way (which Radica
and Ben discovered from the first day).
The number of phone calls and emails Toledo receives that afternoon from
large, multinational law firms with burgeoning Indian Law practice groups
amazes him. None directly solicit the Band's employ, but they all want to
make sure that Toledo is thinking about them. Toledo thinks about his
younger brother, the big kid that colleges called all the time when he was
dominating local high school football fields, but then stopped calling when he
broke his ankle scoring a touchdown to win a game in the playoffs.
When Wendy stops returning the governor's phone calls, the governor
commissions a quick study to determine the negative effects of the Band's
operation. Within two weeks, a research group with ties to anti-Indian treaty
protesters in Wisconsin presents a report that claims the Band's pool, even
with its miracle qualities, devastates local governments and is well on its way
to bankrupting the state government for good.233 The local papers turn
strongly against the Band.23 ' Federal and state politicians begin speaking in
233. Cf Scott Sullivan, GR Chamber Contests Tribe's Casino Claims, PENASSEE GLOBE
(Wayland, Mich.), Mar. 17, 2003, at 1A ("A Grand Rapids Area Chamber of Commerce report
released March 13 contends an Indian casino proposed for Bradley would benefit Allegan
County by $1.2 billion over 10 years, but cost neighbor counties $880 million in that same time
span.").
234. Cf Alan Sayre, Associated Press, Proposed Reservation Casino Doesn't Make Sense
for State (Jan. 19, 2003) ("From the revenue standpoint, an Indian casino makes no sense for
[Louisiana] state government."); Katherine Hutt Scott, Indian Casinos Generating Big Money,
Opposition, NORWICH (CONN.) BuLL., Jan. 13, 2003 ("Indian gaming, the fastest-growing
segment of casino gambling in the country, generated $12.7 billion in revenue in fiscal 2001.
But opposition to new casinos is increasing just as fast."); Editorial, Engler Dealt Too Many to
Michigan's Tribes, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 11, 2003 ("Michigan doesn't need any more
gambling."); Editorial, Tribal Recognition Tainted by Gambling, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 26,
2002 ("Our position is: Gaming interests have disproportionately influenced the tribal
recognition process since the late 1980s.") (emphasis omitted).
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public about introducing bills to regulate and tax miracle pools.235
Weeks later, frustrated with the Band's refusal to share its scientific
findings and its environmental tests, a couple universities and a couple
environmental groups reluctantly file a NEPA suit to compel the closure of the
pool until an environmental impact statement can be prepared. They are
unsure of the consequences of the drawing down of the pool, unsure of even
what the pool is even made, and very concerned about the ecological effects
of the massive, gargantuan influx of people and automobiles in the fragile
ecosystem of Leelanau County and the Grand Traverse Bay. They argue that
if no one knows, then the public may be robbed of a critical and extremely
limited resource.
And though the pool is constantly accessed by thousands of people paying
$1000 a sip every day, the water level miraculously does not decline.
Other fountains of youth pop up, first in Leelanau County and then all over
northern Michigan, their proprietors trying to capitalize on the enormous
profits being realized in Peshawbestown. Most shut down immediately, some
of the bigger ones threatened by the state or the feds with fines for breaking
federal law, but all of them are forced out of business because none of them
can compete with the "genuine article." '236
When it finally becomes impossible for tribal members to access the pool,
the member lawsuits in tribal court multiply. Some of the members threaten
violence. Citing the equal protection clause in the GTB Constitution237 and
the strong tribal policy in favor of Indian preference, acknowledging the
Band's waiver of immunity for suits by tribal members,238 and citing the
immense wealth generated by the enterprise,239 the tribal court does what no
federal or state court could - order the tribal police department to
235. Cf. Scott Rapp, Cayuga County Moves to Block Casino, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse,
N.Y.), Nov. 27, 2002 ("Cayuga County will try to legally block the Cuyuga-Senecas from
opening a casino or other tax-exempt business on land the Oklahoma tribe is buying .....
236. LEAP OF FAITH (Paramount Pictures 1992).
237. GRANDTRAVERSEBANDCONST. art. X, § 1(h) ("The Grand TraverseBand in exercising
the powers of self-government shall not ... [d]eny to any persons within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property with due process of
law.").
238. GRAND TRAVERSE BAND CONST. art. XII, § 2 (waiving the Band's immunity "for the
purpose of enforcing rights and duties established by this Constitution and by the ordinance and
resolutions of the Tribe.").
239. Cf. In re McSauby, No. 9702-001-CV-JR, at 5 (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. July
29, 1997) (en banc) ("In this time of relative resource-rich ability to do many things for the
community benefit .... the Tribal Council must pay Defendant McSauby's attorney fees and
court costs.") (on file with author).
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temporarily shut down the Anishinaabek Fountain of Youth.
A constitutional crisis develops at the Grand Traverse Band. A couple of
council members talk about removing the entire tribal judiciary, but Toledo
reminds the entire council that only the tribal judiciary sitting as one can
remove any tribal judges and only for a limited number of reasons. The only
reason that could possibly apply would be the provision on "gross
misconduct" 24 and the Council would be hard-pressed to prove to the
remainder of the tribaljudiciary that the tribal judge that issued the injunction,
acting in her wise discretion, committed an act of "gross misconduct." The
two or three angry council members relent, but grumble loudly for
impeachment and political reprisal.
Toledo responds immediately to the injunction and requests a fast hearing.
The tribal court, understanding the critical character of the Band's enterprise
to the future of the Band, agrees to a hearing within a week. The local papers
get a couple quotes from a few disgruntled tribal members complaining that
the Tribal Council is despotic and rules by nepotism. 24 ' The national papers,
hot on the lead of the biggest religion story in two millennia, dutifully report
that the discovery of the Fountain of Youth has created terrible rifts between
the haves and the have-nots on the Grand Traverse Reservation. Editorialists
from D.C. to L.A. say they fear for another intratribal bloodletting like what
happened at San Carlos Apache242 or Seneca.243 More than a few editorialists
quote so-called "experts" on tribal politics that claim the Indians have
civilized enough to the point where they hold elections and stay in one place,
but their savage and vulgar dispositions rear their ugly heads when money is
involved, especially where huge amounts of money are involved.
2 44
240. GRAND TRAVERSE BAND CONST. art. V, § 8(d) (providing that the tribal judiciary may
remove a tribal judge for "[glross misconduct that is clearly prejudicial to the administration of
justice").
241. See, e.g., Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Wheel of Misfortune, TIME, Dec. 16,
2002, at 44-47 ("Tribal leaders sometimes rule with an iron fist. Dissent is crushed. Cronyism
flourishes. Those who question how much the casinos really make, where the money goes or
even tribal operations in general may be banished.").
242. See Tom Holm, The Constitutional Conflict at San Carlos, RED INK, Spring 1998, at
31, 31-33.
243. See Porter, supra note 213, at 534 (citing Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal
Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys
Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 235 (1997)).
244. See, e.g., Francis X. Donnelly, Tribes Squabble over the Profits: Casinos Bring
Infighting, Allegations, Threats Along with a Comfortable Lifestyle, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 18,
2000, at 5A ("Even the fledgling Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, which opened its first
casino a year ago, has found itself embroiled in a dispute over direct payments.").
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Toledo, with the assistance of his able and eager new staff attorney, meets
with the Tribal Council to propose and debate plans for tribal member access
to the pool. Toledo presents their proposal to the plaintiffs, a pair of college
educated sisters with an ailing grandmother who cannot easily gain access to
the pool because of the enormous crowds, and they agree to the plan. The
next week, Toledo and the plaintiffs present a reasonable plan to allow tribal
members access to the pool, sort of a priority system. The tribal court
immediately lifts the injunction and the illusory threat of bloodletting is staved
off. The newspapers describe the Tribal Council meeting and the tribal court
hearing as "pow-wows." '24 5
Next on tap is the request for a preliminary injunction by the EPA. Toledo
and the Tribal Council have called on their able outside litigation counsel
located downstate to handle the hearing. As soon as the Band's attorney,
Benjamin Fatto, arrives, he sees a throng of Assistant Attorneys General from
the State of Michigan waiting to view the events as they unfold with rapt
attention. Benjamin approaches the EPA's attorneys and asks them if they
know why the entire Office of Attorney General is present. The EPA's
attorney states that he believes the State intends to intervene as soon as the
hearing is over. Benjamin asks the EPA attorney what he can offer to the EPA
to make the case go away and keep the State out of the Band's hair, at least for
the time being. The two attorneys walk out together and talk for twenty
minutes in the coffee shop across the street from the Federal Building in
Grand Rapids. Benjamin agrees to allow the EPA to access the site of the
pool for testing and monitor the whole situation in exchange for the dismissal
of the suit.
After the EPA agrees to sit out, temporarily putting off the charge from the
state Attorney General's Seventh Cavalry, the case filed by the state
universities and local environmental groups comes up. The pool is a
miracle - healing the ailments of the people that consume its waters - that
science cannot explain. The existence of the pool, halfway up the side of a
245. Editorial, Big Chief Pataki, WALL STREET J., Mar. 1, 2002, at A14. On the question
of stereotypes, Paula Gunn Allen wrote:
A careful examination of the process by which the indigenous inhabitants of
this hemisphere were dehumanized and made into Disneyesque characters,
villainous or noble, will demonstrate how destructive of rational thought and
consciousness stereotyping is. It is not only the target group that is distorted and
dehumanized. The users of the stereotype are greatly harmed psychically as well,
and they haven't any means of protecting or assessing the psychic damage done
to themselves because they lack any outside reference.
GUNN ALLEN, supra note 23, at 99-100.
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hill where no water has ever collected, is another oddity. The universities
argue that the pool should be declared a rare and finite public property, one
to be studied and preserved. Though no federal action has taken place, the
universities argue that not a single federal agency has signed off on a finding
of no significant impact (FONSI).246 The environmental expert witnesses
estimate that the Band's enterprise disposes of hundreds of thousands of
gallons of water every day. Benjamin files a motion to dismiss because none
of the dollars going to the Fountain of Youth enterprise are federal dollars.
No federal agency action takes place. The court agrees and dismisses the
action.
Months pass and the Band focuses on the internal issues of being overrun
by another non-Indian horde of invaders, this one paying as its goes. At the
annual general meeting, the tribal membership confronts the Tribal Council
on the issue of per capita payments. In five months, the revenues from the
pool enterprise have reached $600 million, several times what the gaming
enterprises generate over the course of a whole year. The EBITDA ratio on
the pool enterprise is an astonishing eighty percent. Toledo has already
instructed the Council to inform the tribal membership that the Band cannot
issue per capita payments for anything other than gaming and even then only
upon the approval of a revenue allocation ordinance by the Secretary of the
Interior.247 Given the enormous revenue generated by the Fountain of Youth,
the Tribal Council maps out a plan to provide adequate health care, education,
housing, social services, and any other governmental assistance desired to all
tribal members. The Tribal Council agrees to employ all unemployed tribal
members at a living wage and provide a pension to retired and disabled tribal
members. The tribal membership generally approves.
And with that, the budget is set.
The backlash against the Tribal Council's plan on what to do with all the
dough does not come from within, but from conservative reactionary
politicians, commentators, and think tanks that accuse the Tribal Council of
reinventing Soviet-style Communism,248 welfare state dependence,249 and
246. See, e.g., TOMAC v. Norton, 240 F. Supp. 2d 45, 47 n.2 (D.D.C. 2003) (describing
FONSI law).
247. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)3 (2000).
248. See generally Comment, supra note 220, at 977-78 (describing a claim by non-Indians
that the Indian Reorganization Act was a subversive plot by the Soviet Union). The
commentator described the story as such:
The IRA has encountered less subtle opposition from other quarters. Even in
the earliest stages of its history, Indians were not the only persons concerned with
the IRA. A small, white propaganda machine existed in Muskogee, Oklahoma, the
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dictatorial paternalism.25 Members of Congress talk about how the need for
Indian tribal sovereign immunity has passed, recalling the glory days of fierce
Indian fighter Slade Gorton.25" ' The State governor, angered by the Band's
refusal to concede to some form of state taxation of their main revenue source
and seeing an opportunity to garner a few votes come election time from the
more rabid anti-Indians, joins the suit by the local property owners to destroy
the Grand Traverse Band.
The Band's hearty outside litigation counsel Benjamin Fatto prepares to
respond to the State's gargantuan motion for summary judgment with a hearty
reply. Powerful lawyers from four or five multinational law firms based out
of New York, DC, San Francisco, Seattle, etc. write letters and make personal
phone calls to several council members. They are not directly soliciting the
center of approximately 100,000 Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes. This group
has access to the news media, and it issued periodic charges that grossly
misrepresented the Act and attributed fabricated statements to Commissioner
[John] Collier. Through these charges ran the theme that the Act was a product of
Moscow being put over on the Indians by the Roosevelt Administration and that
it was an "inhumane, unconstitutional, and un-American scheme." A story based
on "information" supplied by this group appeared in the New York Herald-
Tribune on April 4, 1934. Under the headline, "Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Urges Tribesmen of Oklahoma to Accept Soviet Style of Rule," the story
contained lies, distortions, and prophesies of horror, hardly conducive to the
acceptance of the IRA.
Id. at 977 (footnotes and citations omitted).
249. Author Vine Deloria, Jr. wrote:
A rather ingenious argument... emerged. People claimed that they did have
Indian blood but that their grandparents had rejected the federal government out
of hand, had moved to the nearest city or fled to the deepest woods, and had nobly
and steadfastly refused all federal offers of aid over a period of three or four
generations. Thus federal scholarships, the distribution of claims money per
capita, and preservation of lands in trust had all been rejected out of hand by these
superpatriotic Indians. So prevalent has this explanation become that its claimants
have sniped at real blood enrolled Indians as being morally deficient for remaining
on the reservations and within the tribes.
Vine Deloria, Jr., More Others, in SPIRrr & REASON: THE VINE DELORIA, JR., READER 249,251-
52 (1999).
250. Cf. Wheeler-Howard Act - Exempt Certain Indians, Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 76th Cong. 66-67 (1940) (statements of John Collier, Commissioner
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs) (denying allegations from members of Congress that the BIA
employed both Communists and Nazis).
251. See generally American Indian Equal Justice Act, S. 1691, 105th Cong. §§ 1-2 (1998)
(restricting tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians and providing for a waiver of tribal
governments' immunity from suit in federal court).
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Band; they are just letting the Council members know that their firms'
litigation practice groups handle complex litigation in federal courts all the
time. The council members remember when their only attorney was a staff
attorney for the Michigan Indian Legal Services fresh out of law school and
are deeply impressed by the attention given to them by power-suited lawyers.
Whenever a council member attends a self-governance conference or a
National Congress of American Indians conference, a powerful lawyer is there
to take them out to dinner at expensive steakhouses. A week before the
scheduling conference with the federal district court judge to determine a
briefing schedule on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the Tribal
Council votes 5-2 to purchase the services of Berkman, Deloria, Goldman, and
Petoskey,252 a major east cost firm with strong ties to the Republican Party
powerhouse in DC and Texas. At first, the firm's attorneys merely advise
Benjamin on procedural matters, but by the time the Band's brief is due,
Benjamin is shunted aside and Berkman, Deloria associates do all the drafting
- at $250-$450 per hour.253 The Tribal Council finally relieves Benjamin
from his work after the brief is completed.
Benjamin, somewhat bitter at losing most of the work for his biggest client,
learns that Berkman, Deloria had represented several small towns in an eastern
state that had litigated against the local Indian tribes when those tribes tried
to open their own casino. Berkman, Deloria used a major public relations and
slash-and-burn litigation scheme - a SLAPP-style 254 strategy - to
252. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, "I Shall Hear You No Further," 27 VT. L. REv. 565,604
(2003).
253. "The power of non-Indian attorneys in prestigious law finns cannot be underestimated.
Reservation Indians feel fortunate to have large firms with luxurious offices in the nation's
capital .... " VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN
JUSTICE 144 (1983).
254. SLAPP stands for "Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation." A New York court
characterized SLAPP-type lawsuits as follows:
SLAPP suits come in many forms camouflaged as ordinary lawsuits .... The
conceptual thread that binds them is that they are suits without substantial merit
that are brought by private interests to stop citizens from exercising their political
rights or to punish them for having done so.
The longer the litigation can be stretched out, the more litigation that can be
churned, the greater the expense that is inflicted and the closer the SLAPP filer
moves to success. The purpose of such gamesmanship ranges from simple
retribution for past activism to discouraging future activism. Needless to say, an
ultimate disposition in favor of the target often amounts merely to a pyrrhic
victory. Those who lack the financial resources and emotional stamina to play out
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overwhelm the small tribes, and the casinos were never built. He digs around
in his files until he finds the Berkman, Deloria letter disclosing the potential
conflicts of interest with other clients. Apparently, the Tribal Council signed
the letter waiving the conflict without reading much of the content.
An army of high-priced Berkman, Deloria lawyers counterattack against the
State and the property owners with a barrage of pleadings and procedural
motions, including no fewer than four motions to dismiss on procedural
grounds. An army of lobbyists associated with Berkman, Deloria attack the
State's rearguard with political pressure from Michigan's congressional
delegation.
The brief filed by the State and the property owners contains a parade of
horribles about the Fountain of Youth and the danger posed to American
Democracy by the monstrous advent of Indian tribal economic clout. The
plaintiffs argue that Indian tribes will not stop until the entire continent is
safely in Indian hands.255 Using language culled from a brief filed by
Berkman, Deloria lawyers in another case, the plaintiffs argue that the state
and local governments will be overwhelmed by the effects of the Band's
216
enterprise.6 The plaintiffs argue that if the Band is not stopped, then Indian
tribal businesses will run rampant throughout the United States, 257 the
the "game" face the difficult choice of defaulting despite meritorious defenses or
being brought to their knees to settle. The ripple effect of such suits in our society
is enormous. Persons who have been outspoken on issues of public importance
targeted in such suits or who have witnessed such suits will often choose in the
future to stay silent. Short of a gun to the head, a greater threat to First
Amendment expression can scarcely be imagined.
Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (N.Y. Sup. 1992) (footnote, quotation marks, and
citations omitted), affd 616 N.Y.S.2d 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), leave to appeal denied 84
N.Y.2d 813 (N.Y. 1995). See generally Lori Potter, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participations and Petition Clause Immunity, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,852 (2001).
255. Cf Brief for Amicus Curiae Proper Economic Resource Management, Inc. at 11,
Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (No. 00-454) ("Unless a bright line
is drawn, tribal governments and tribal courts will understandably continue to attempt to expand
the extent and reach of tribal powers.").
256. Cf Brief for Amici Curiae Towns of Ledyard, North Stonington, and Preston,
Connecticut at 2-3, Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001) (No. 00-507)
(listing problems with "traffic control, police, emergency services, social services, and others"
as a result of the establishment and success of the Foxwoods Casino).
257. Cf. Brief of Amicus Curiae States of South Dakota, Alaska, California, Connecticut,
Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New York,
Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin at 17, Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751
(1998) (No. 96-1037) ("The business options open to each one of the 320 tribes, perhaps in
combination with other financial interests, are virtually limitless.").
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consequences of their enterprises amounting to little more than looting and
pillaging.
The district court never rules on the motions. To settle the issues with the
state government, local townships, and counties, the Band agrees to provide
payments over and above the amount the governments expend in dealing with
traffic congestion, increase in (mostly perceived) crime, sewage and water use
issues, and other adverse effects of the pool enterprise. When the State pulls
out, the property owners, unable to afford the price of countering the
Berkman, Deloria legal assault, have no choice but to exit as well. To settle
the issues with the environmental groups regarding the increased air, water,
noise, and light pollution, as well as, the increased garbage problem, the Band
agrees to remediate the whole area affected by the pool enterprise. The Band
has enough left over to accomplish its goals for the tribal membership.
Lawsuits come and go regarding the Fountain of Youth. The Band prevails
in most and settles a few for money and access for environmental testing,
scientific study, and inspection, but the pool remains open virtually every day.
Exactly one year after the Tribal Council opened the enterprise, the Chief
Financial Officer reports that the net income from the pool alone exceeds $1
billion. Staff members from the Conservation Department, the Environmental
Quality Department, and the Economic Development Corporation advise the
Tribal Council that, although millions of people have tasted a sip of the water
through wet weather and dry weather, and although the pool itself appears to
contain only a few hundred cubic liters of water, the water level never seems
to drop measurably - yet another miracle.
Toledo writes a 100-page law review article with over 400 footnotes258
describing the abject (yet hypothetical) horror of asking the Secretary of the
Interior to place the parcel of land upon which the Fountain of Youth is
located into trust.2 9 He ends the article by stating that the advantages of the
enterprise afforded to the Band would not have been possible if the land had
not already been placed into trust. The dominant society would not have
allowed it, he concludes. 6 ° Toledo resigns his position about three years after
258. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous and Critical Race Practice, 95
MICH. L. REv. 741,744 (1997) ("[T]hey told me I had to get tenure. The way for me to do that,
as I soon came to learn, was to publish three 100-page law review articles with 400 footnotes.").
259. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2000) (authorizing the Secretary to take land into trust for
the benefit of Indian tribes) and 25 C.F.R. pt. 151 (implementing § 465) with Letter from Gale
A. Norton, Secretary of the Department of the Interior, to Hon. Cyrus Schindler, Nation
President, Seneca Nation of Indians 1, 3 (Nov. 12, 2002) (on file with author) (approving
gaming compact allowing off-reservation gaming "reluctantly" and with "extreme[] concern[]").
260. See, e.g., Cohen, Erosion of Indian Rights, supra note 30, at 368-69 (describing how
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the opening of the Fountain of Youth to take a teaching job at a small law
school in the far west. The young, eager staff attorney takes over and hires a
younger, more eager staff attorney to assist.
New Age religious fakirs write books in the vein of Carlos Casteneda,
exploiting the Anishinaabek Fountain of Youth and creating legends about a
mythical voyage taken by Ponce de Leon up the Mississippi River and over
the Illinois plains (never mind that the entire area was covered in huge, old-
growth forests), into Lake Michigan and over to the Leelanau Peninsula.
Kevin Costner talks about writing a new screenplay about Ponce de Leon
(with himself in the lead role).
Over the next three years, the Fountain of Youth operates cleanly and
efficiently, bringing incredible revenues to the Band (exceeding $2 billion in
the fourth year) and providing phenomenal medical care for the entire tribal
membership. Lawsuits start up again intermittently as flashpoints of unrest
occur such as bad automobile accidents, but the Band settles them quickly.
the BIA destroyed the Blackfeet Indians' thriving cattle enterprise in the 1950s). Cohen wrote:
During the drought years in the 1930's, the Government, as a measure of relief
to distressed farmers, purchased drought cattle at an average price of about $12 a
head. Most of these cattle were given away free to relief clients. Under
Commissioner Myer's administration, Indian tribes which received such drought
cattle have been charged up to $140 or more a head for what started out as a gift
and was a gift to everybody who wasn't an Indian. The practice of making gifts to
Indians and then charging the Indians for the gift was not invented by
Commissioner Myer - it runs back many decades in our Indian history - but
charging Indians $140 or more for a gift that cost the giver only $12 is a new
wrinkle on an old game.
The Blackfeet Indians wouldn't have minded being charged for the wobbly,
drought-stricken cows they received as a gift. They had no objection to paying
retroactive interest on these gifts. In effect, for many of the cattle, the Indian
Bureau charged interest at a rate of 70% per annum. But repaying cattle loans,
even at 70% interest, was worthwhile, the Blackfeet felt, since only in this way
would they achieve final and complete ownership of their own cattle. What
shocked the Blackfeet, however, was that in June, 1950, after they had paid back
the Indian Bureau many times over for the last cow they received, they were
suddenly advised by the Indian Bureau that title to the cattle was still vested in the
Bureau and that the Bureau would arrange for the disposition of the cattle as it
thought best. Bitter protests as this breach of faith were completely futile. The
Chairman of the House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee, Representative
Michael Kirwan, declared that he "will not believe" that "this Government, your
Government, and my Government" would do any such thing. But when the Indian
Bureau itself supplied facts and figures confirming the charge, the House
Committee quickly dropped the subject.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
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Nasty lawsuits are bad for business. Anti-Indian sentiment fails to take hold,
overwhelmed by the large gifts donated by the Band to local schools and
social service providers.26' The entire business community becomes
somewhat dependent on the Band's enterprise - the housing construction
industry, the tourism industry, the cherry industry, and the litigation industry.
Toledo and his eager young staff attorney devote less and less time to advising
the Band's governmental services departments and managing litigation in
federal, state, and tribal court. The Band relies less and less on the federal
government for funding, eventually doing away with its grants department.
The Band creates massive trusts for its elders, its children, its future
investment, and for the purpose of purchasing land to reconstitute the two
reservations. The Band purchases over 5000 acres of very expensive land in
its six-county service area - Leelanau, Grand Traverse, Antrim, Charlevoix,
Benzie, and Manistee Counties.
262
The local newspapers treat the Band and its enterprise as though it is the
big bad mother of Grende12 63 running roughshod over the pitiful non-Indian
inhabitants of Leelanau County. The Band's historians contribute stories
about several parcels of land within the portions of the Grand Traverse
Reservation created by the Treaty of 1855. The stories describe how the
parcels were intended by the treaty to be owned by the Indians, but the non-
Indians in the area used violence, intimidation, and lawyers to drive the
Indians out. The Band's historians publicize how history until the late-1980s
is one of poverty and misery. And yet the local newspapers do not relent in
their biting and scathing journalistic assaults, as sort of journalistic
microaggression. 264 The newspapers acknowledge that the Band may have
been politically weak and utterly destitute only a few decades before, but with
the coming of the Fountain of Youth the Band is a giant among average
261. See generally WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND, supra note 121, at 214
("Gaming tribes in many states have poured money into their own infrastructural needs, but
have also given generously to local schools, nonprofits, and arts, health, and social service
agencies that serve citizens of all states.").
262. See GRAND TRAVERSE BAND CONST. art. I, § 2(a).
263. See BEOWULF 23 (E. Talbot Donaldson trans., 1966) ("Grendel's mother, woman,
monster-wife, was mindful of her misery, she who had to dwell in the terrible water, the cold
currents ... ").
264. Cf Peggy C. Davis, Popular Legal Culture: Law As Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J.
1559, 1560 (1989) ("The claim of pervasive, unconscious racism is easily devalued. The charge
has come to be seen as egregious defamation and to carry an aura of responsibility.
Nonetheless, the claim is well founded.") (footnote and citation omitted).
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citizens that cannot be tamed. The back-and-forth between the Band and its
detractors continues, ebbing and flowing as time passes.
And then, four years to the day after the discovery of the Fountain of Youth
by little Niko Roberts, the pool runs dry. Over the course of a few months, the
lines fall back, the EDC focuses on other projects, and the Band moves on.
The magic pool never returns.
The Band no longer needs (nor can it afford) to pay the huge retainer
required to maintain its relationship with Berkman, Deloria and the firm
moves on. Politicians and lawyers stop taking tribal council members to lunch
and dinner and college basketball games. The rest of the riff-raff slowly drift
off as well - all the New Agers and the people selling Fountain of Youth tee-
shirts and figurines. There is no market for them anymore. Many supposedly
sympathetic commentators say they believe the Band will return to poverty,
robbed of its traditions, and vulnerable to extinction just as it was in 1980
before the Department of Interior finally recognized the Band.265 There is a
wave of "I told you so"-type editorials claiming that this or that editorialist
always knew the Fountain of Youth would dry up. They say the Band has sold
its soul for the immoral dollar and probably deserved the troubles that lay
ahead.2" Nothing like this happens.
The Band's relationship with the local governments improves. The Band
becomes just another quiet property owner in Leelanau County. It even pays
its taxes (through the gaming compact) on time. Its children return to the
reservation after college and use their education for the benefit of the Band.
The Band becomes a leader in efforts to preserve the relatively pristine quality
of the Grand Traverse Bay area ecology. The Tribal Council and the tribal
government continue to operate, dealing with animal control ordinances, treaty
fishing and hunting rights, and Indian Child Welfare questions. Without
realizing it, the Tribal Council rides the last revenue ripples of the Fountain
of Youth tide to complete self-reliance. The Band no longer needs federal
government grants and appropriations. Its members do not reside in poverty,
nor are they tortured by excess wealth. Other than minor contracts and small
265. See Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa
and Chippewa Indians as an Indian Tribe, 45 Fed. Reg. 19,321 (1980).
266. See, e.g., National Gambling Impact Study Commission Report, Executive Summary
(June 18, 1999) (Statement of Richard C. Leone, Commissioner) ("I believe that, on balance,
the American people are net losers in a society of pervasive gambling."); id. at 52 (Summary
Statement by Commissioner James C. Dobson, Ph.D.) ("Clearly, gambling is a destroyer that
ruins lives and wrecks families."), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edulngisc/reports/
al.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
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claims, the Band rarely needs legal assistance. The Band cooperates with
local governments in ways never before possible with the disputes over
jurisdiction and taxation.267
Once the Fountain of Youth closes up, the local and national newspapers
forget about the Band. Other Indian tribes take up the news - the New York
tribes are resisting state taxation again; 268 the Oklahoma tribes are pushing for
Class III gaming again; 269 the New Mexico tribes are threatening to exercise
their water rights again; 27° and the California tribes are pushing for the entire
state to secede from the Union. The Band's enterprises do not charge ahead
of non-Indian businesses and so the non-Indians do not complain. The Band
provides financial assistance when needed for local schools and utilities and
so the local governments do not complain. The Band's trust funds and
investments keep the Band afloat, and its modest success keeps it out of the
news.
Peshawbestown becomes the model for Indian tribes and indigenous
peoples everywhere. There is wealth, but not too much. And there is work to
do, but not too much. The Band breaks out of the cycle of perception placed
upon modern Indian tribes - either a tribe is perceived as poor, weak, and
pitiful, allowing the dominant culture to sympathize with it; or a tribe is
perceived as wealthy, strong, and abusive, allowing the dominant culture to
demonize it. The Band has moved through the first two phases into a third,
unprecedented phase - the Band is modestly wealthy, uses its power
sparingly or not at all, and beneficent.
267. But cf Brief of Amicus Curiae National Congress of American Indians, National Indian
Gaming Commission, and Individual Tribes at 12-17, Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians
of the Bishop Community of the Bishop Colony, 123 S. Ct. 1887 (2003) (No. 02-281)
(describing the numerous cooperative law enforcement agreements with jurisdictions around
the United States).
268. See, e.g., Glenn Coin, Casinomania: A Casino in Every Neighborhood, Hope for
Money in Every Coffer, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Jan. 12, 2003, at Al ("State
legislators and the governor are betting that the largest expansion of gambling in state history
will help resolve the state's fiscal crunch.").
269. See, e.g., Dave Hinton, Tribe Aimsfor Casino Deal, PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, Ill.),
Jan. 12, 2003, at B3 ("Representatives for Gary, Ind., and the Miami Indian Tribe of Oklahoma
continue to negotiate for the placement of a land-based casino in that city.").
270. See, e.g., J.D. Bullington, Casinos Are Only One Path to Tribal Clout, ALBUQUERQUE
TRiB., Dec. 16, 2002, at 2 ("The issue of water rights provides just one vivid example of the
growing economic self-sufficiency of American Indians .... Indians have reserved senior water
rights that have gone largely unused for years because no money has been available to build
Indian irrigation and water systems.").
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Occasionally, a tribal member talks about the Band moving beyond self-
reliance into nationhood-joining the United Nations, stepping outside of the
three sovereign system of the United States, and forming its own government
and its own nation. The tribal member has few listeners, for though there is
much to gain from nationhood, there is also much to lose.
A year or so after the Fountain of Youth runs dry, the United States
Congress, citing the examples of the Grand Traverse Band's Fountain of
Youth, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe's Foxwoods Casino, and the
Mississippi Choctaw's staggering success in its business affairs, declares that
the business of Indian Affairs as we know it is over. Citing its so-called
plenary power,27" ' the legislature enacts a law that would force the Indian tribes
into a new paradigm. Following Self-Determination and Self-Governance,
Congress calls it the Self-Reliance Act and claims that it is the solution to the
"Indian problem."2"' Congress declares that, from now on, it will authorize
expenditures to provide services for only 100 federally recognized Indian
tribes.273 Congress prohibits the federal recognition of Indian tribes, excising
the "Procedures for Establishing That an American Indian Group Exists as an
271. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 529-30 (2000); Alaska v. Native Village of
Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520,531 n.6 (1998); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522
U.S. 329, 343 (1998); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak & Circle Village, 501 U.S. 775,
791 (1991); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989); Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 734 (1987); Oneida County, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y.
State, 470 U.S. 226,249 (1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 156 (1982);
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371,426 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 146 n.12 (1980); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979); Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331
(1978); Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-84 (1977); Antoine v.
Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203-04 (1975); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974);
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973). But see generally
Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, supra note 68.
272. See William Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations,
Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
1, 71 (2002-03); Glauner, supra note 18, at 929; William W. Quinn, Jr., Federal
Acknowledgement of American Indian Tribes: The Historical Development of a Legal Concept,
34 AM. J. LEGALHIST. 331, 348 (1990); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian
Law: The Hard Trial of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian
Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219, 261-62.
273. As of July 1, 2002, the federal government recognized 562 tribal entities. See Indian
Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian
Affairs, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,328 (July 12, 2002).
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Indian Tribe"274 from the Code of Federal Regulations. In order to avoid
taking responsibility for its actions, it orders each of the Indian tribes to send
a representative to a National Council for Unifying and Stabilizing Tribes
Equally and Responsibly. The Council will have exactly one year from the
passage of the new law to decide which of the 100 federally recognized Indian
tribes will continue to receive services. The remaining 460-plus tribes will
continue to exist, but will not be eligible for federal services or federal
protections of any kind. If the Council does not make a decision within the
one-year deadline, Congress will decide which tribes stay and which tribes
go - randomly, through a process no different than the state lotteries on tv
during the local news.
The return on the Indian tribes' investment in Congress' new plan is that
each of the 100 remaining tribes will have everything Indians have been
asking for since 1492 - established reservation boundaries in accordance
with the express terms of treaties;2 5 protection of all treaty rights; 276
unchallenged regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction over all criminal and
civil actions within the reservation boundaries;27 7 the power to remove all
unwanted persons (including wealthy property owners) from within the
reservation boundaries (with Congress providing the just compensation); 278
adequate funding for all BIA and IHS and other federal agency programs
intended to benefit Indian tribes;2 79 recognition of tribal court judgments in
federal courts; 28 - everything save nationhood or membership in the United
274. 25 C.F.R. pt. 83 (2003).
275. See, e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 404 (1994) ("Congress can unilaterally alter
reservation boundaries.") (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567-68 (1903)).
276. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 188-91
(1999) (holding that Indian Tribe's usufructory treaty rights were not extinguished).
277. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645,659-60 (2001) (Souter,
J., concurring) ("Montana's 'general proposition' that 'the inherent sovereign powers of an
Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe... is, however, the first
principle, regardless of whether the land at issue is fee land, or land owned by or held in trust
for an Indian tribe.") (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)).
278. See, e.g., Montana, 450 U.S. at 557-63 (discussing Indian tribes' power to exclude).
279. See, e.g., Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Babbitt, 87 F.3d 1338, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(discussing claim by Indian tribes that the Secretary of the Interior did not distribute adequate
contract support costs in accordance with the Indian Self-Determination Act) (citing 25 U.S.C.
§§ 450-458 (1994)); cf Navajo Nation v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 325 F.3d 1133 (9th
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that Indian Tribe could not administer the Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families program).
280. Cf. MICH. CT. R. 2.615 (establishing procedures to recognize Michigan tribal court
judgments in Michigan courts). Cf generally Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Note, Towards Tribal
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Nations.
As an afterthought, several Senators attach riders eliminating the sovereign
immunity, 28' tax exemptions,25 2 Indian preference provisions, 28 3 Title VII
exemptions, 28 and treaty rights285 of the tribes not included on the Hot 100
List. A few House members eliminate the special canon of statutory and
treaty construction to the benefit of the tribes 286 not included on the Hot 100
List. All of these riders pass.
Congress provides for the litigation over the constitutionality of the Act to
be heard in the Supreme Court immediately, suggesting the Court certify a
limited number of petitioners. Congress orders the tribes to meet in the
Council during the time the suits are pending before the Court. The one-year
deadline is firm, Congress says.
Sovereignty and Judicial Efficiency: Ordering the Defenses of Tribal Sovereign Immunity and
Exhaustion of TribalRemedies, 101 MICH.L. REv. 569,599 (2002) ("Some federal courts have
asserted that the federal courts are not competent to decide matters of tribal law and that for
them to do so undermines notions of tribal-federal comity.") (citing Basil Cook Enters. v. St.
Regis Mohawk Tribe, 117 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1997)).
281. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
282. See, e.g., County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 270 (1992) (excise tax exemption).
283. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 472 (2000) (establishing Indian preference for qualified Indians
in the Bureau of Indian Affairs).
284. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
285. See, e.g., United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 213 (W.D. Mich. 1979) ("When
the Indians granted to the United States their ownership in the land and waters of the Great
Lakes described in Article First of the 1836 treaty, they retained all those rights not specifically
conveyed. Among the retained rights was their aboriginal right to continue to fish in the ceded
waters of the Great Lakes."), stay granted, 623 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1980), modified, 653 F.2d
277 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981); United States v. Washington, 384 F.
Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), afftd, 520 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975).
286. Statutes are "to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous
provisions interpreted to their benefit." Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985);
see Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 92 (2d
Cir. 2000) ('The fact that the Tribe today is at no practical disadvantage does not strip the
Indian canon of its force."); Pueblo of Sandia v. Babbitt, 231 F.3d 878,879 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
('The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the canon of construction that resolves
ambiguity in any document related to Indian lands in favor of the Indian claim.") (citing Antoine
v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975) and Oneida County, New York v. Oneida Indian
Nation of N.Y. State, 470 U.S. 226,247-48 (1985)); Jill de la Hunt, Note, The Canons ofIndian
Treaty and Statutory Construction: A Proposalfor Codification, 17 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 681,
692 (1984) ("When assimilation policies conflicted with treaty provisions guaranteeing Indian
autonomy, the courts continued nevertheless to construe treaty provisions in favor of Indian
understanding.") (footnote and citation omitted).
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The Grand Traverse Band Tribal Council convenes to debate a strategy. A
few council members, deeply offended at Congress, would vote to ignore the
whole process and rely on the Band's investments. These council members
argue that federal recognition is a means to an end and no government agency
needs to legitimize the Grand Traverse Band, not any more. The remainder
of the Council agrees in principle with the minority but they also respect
realpolitik - survival is at stake. The Band draws Toledo Vader, their
aged,287 trusted 8 warrior, out from his teaching gig and sends him to the
Council. Toledo had been General Counsel across three decades and had
assisted the Band through difficult times. Most importantly, the Council
agreed that he is a tougher negotiator than any of the individual council
members. Wendy, still the Chair of the Council, instructs Toledo do anything
he can to ensure the preservation of the Band. Toledo brings with him a small
vial of water he took from the Fountain of Youth for strength in the coming
months.
With uncertainty hanging over Indian tribes like never before, the Council
for Unifying and Stabilizing Tribes Equally and Responsibly convenes. The
debates rage fast and furious. Some smaller tribes with no land base try to cut
deals with neighboring tribes with a substantial land base to effectuate
mergers, no matter the historical problems associated with consolidated
reservations. 89 Many of the largest tribes try to band together to consolidate
a voting bloc to preserve their interests. The alliances fade in and fade out,
some based regionally, some based on economic strength, some based on
similar languages and cultures, some based on the personality of a particular
representative, some based on common treaty issues and so on.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court accepts four petitions on the
287. Cf Cree v. Flores, 157 F.3d 762, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding district court's
deference to Yakarna tribal elder over testimony of other experts) (citing United States v.
Skokomish Indian Tribe, 764 F.2d 676, 673 (9th Cir. 1985)).
288. "[Llonger-term decision-making about the society's welfare - essentially strategic
management - lay in the hands of often more senior individuals who, because of their
accumulated wisdom, were trusted to interpret and protect the collective interest over the long
run." Steven Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances for
Economic Development on American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES DO?:
STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIANECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1, 33 (Stephen
Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992).
289. See generally WARD CHURCHILL, STRUGGLE FORTHE LAND: NATIVENORTH AMERICAN
RESISTANCE TO GENOCIDE, ECOCIDE AND COLONIZATION 135-72 (2002) [hereinafter
CHURCHILL, STRUGGLE FOR THE LANDI (blaming the federal government and private interests
for conflating a non-existent confrontation between Navajos and Hopis).
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constitutionality of the Self-Reliance Act. The first petition the Court accepts
involves the Fifth Amendment challenge by Indian property owners in and
around Indian Reservations.29 The second petition regards a Tenth and
Eleventh Amendment challenge on the basis of States' rights.29 The third
petition is from a treaty rights group also making Fifth Amendment292 and
Equal Protection claims29 3 and claims based on the trust doctrine.2 94 The
fourth petition is from the National Congress of American Indians and other
national Indian rights advocacy groups and claims that Congress does not have
plenary power 95 to enact the Self-Reliance Act, or as they dub it, the "New
Termination Act." The Solicitor General's office, with a stubborn and hard-
nosed Indian fighter in office and support from the White House, comes down
in favor of the Act.296 Dozens of Justice Department attorneys dedicate the
290. Cf. Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712, 719 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting claim by non-
Indians that they have compensable property rights to license to graze on public property);
Bigelow v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 727 F. Supp. 346,352 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (holding
that Indian treaty fishing rights do not violate non-Indian commercial fishers property interests),
vacated, 970 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1992).
291. Cf Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wis. v. United
States, 259 F. Supp. 2d 783, 798-99 (W.D. Wis. 2003) (rejecting argument that the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act required the State of Wisconsin to regulate Indian tribal gaming).
292. Cf Karuk Tribe of Indians v. Ammon, 209 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (rejecting
plaintiffs' argument that they had a compensable Fifth Amendment property interest in the
Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation), cert. denied sub nom. Karuk Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 532 U.S. 941 (2001).
293. Cf Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 158 F.3d 1335, 1340
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that ordinary rational basis scrutiny applies to Indian classifications
under the equal protection clause).
294. Compare Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) ("Under a
humane and self imposed policy which has found expression in many acts of Congress and
numerous decisions of this Court, it has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest
responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in
dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.")
with United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 123 . Ct. 1126, 1138 n.1 (2003)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Rather, the general relationship between Indian tribes and [the United
States] traditionally has been understood to be in the nature of a guardian-ward relationship.
A guardianship is not a trust.") (quoting Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl.
565, 573 (1990)).
295. See generally Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, supra
note 68; Comment, Federal Plenary Power Over Indian Affairs After Weeks and Sioux Nation,
131 U. PA. L. REv. 235, 235 (1982) ("Indian Tribes traditionally have been unsuccessful in
litigation involving the plenary power rule because their aboriginal and treaty rights generally
are not recognized as limits upon this federal power.").
296. Cf Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at2l n.10, Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone
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first months of the year to prepare to respond to the several petitions on behalf
of the legislation.
Legal commentators argue about what the Court will do. Most argue that
the Court will reject the Act out of hand - there are too many private
property interests at stake. But a few argue that the Court may agree with
Congress and view the Act as a proper solution to the "Indian Problem. 297
For these commentators, 298 the Act has many advantages - elimination of
checkerboard jurisdiction,2 99 improved certainty of the law in future
disputes,3°" and much simpler administration of Indian affairs.3"' As the
Indians of the Bishop Community of the Bishop Colony, 123 S. Ct. 1887 (2003) (No. 02-281)
("The Tribes' sovereignty, while subordinate to the sovereignty of the United States, is not
subordinate to that of the States.")
297. "[T]he Indian problem is now becoming a bureaucratic one and just as the country
seems determined to abandon these federal initiatives in so many areas." RENNARD
STRICKLAND, TONTO's REVENGE 111 (1997).
298. Compare L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the
Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 813 (1996) (identifying a Supreme Court "doctrine of
consent-based sovereignty") and Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special
Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537, 611 (1996) (arguing that "a
history of statutes singling out the relevant group also will not create a special relationship")
with Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in
Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1765 (1997) [hereinafter Frickey, Adjudication
and Its Discontents] (criticizing Gould and Benjamin for, inter alia, failing to recognize that
"[tihe Constitution became possible only by virtue of colonization, and the document rests
awkwardly on top of that history").
299. See generally Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation,
425 U.S. 463,479 (1976) ("Congress by its more modem legislation has evinced a clear intent
to eschew any such 'checkerboard' approach within an existing Indian reservation, and our
cases have in turn followed Congress' lead in this area."); Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash.
State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962) ("[A]n impractical pattern of checkerboard
jurisdiction was avoided by the plain language of § 1151 and we see no justification for
adopting an unwarranted construction of that language where the result would be merely to
recreate confusion Congress specifically sought to avoid.").
300. Cf. John F. Petoskey, Doing Business with Michigan Indian Tribes, 76 MICH. B.J. 440,
445-46 (1997) ("[Tribal tax exemption] litigation has produced considerable confusion, largely
as a result of apparent inconsistencies in the decision applying this test. Tribes, states, and
potential investors cannot predict the outcome of the test as applied to a particular fact
situation."); Andrew S. Montgomery, Tribal Sovereignty and Congressional Dominion: Rights-
of-Way for Gas Pipelines on Indian Reservations, 38 STAN. L. REV. 195,222 (1985) (describing
Indian Law as a "muddle").
301. Cf. COUNCILONINTERRACIALBOOKS FOR CHILDREN, CHRONICLES OFAMERICAN INDIAN
PROTEST 372 (1971) ("At the Fort Peck Reservation jail which has a leak from a gas line under
it, the BIA, instead of repairing the leak, installing a red light in the cells which flashes on and
off when the density of gas gets too high.").
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months pass, these commentators acquire more and more disciples, liberal and
conservative, Indian and non-Indian. Public opinion sways dangerously
against the tribes.3"2
Infighting pervades the council for the first few months - sometimes bitter
and sometimes almost sadistically personal. Toledo takes his first sip from the
vial he brought and begins work. Around 350 tribes sign a petition generated
by Toledo and the Grand Traverse Band to eliminate politics by approving a
weighted lottery system 30 3 or, failing that, a true lottery to determine which
tribes may go forward. Most of the 350 tribes are the tribes that were on the
federal recognition list on the date of its first publication in 1979 .3' The
tribes that refuse to sign generally are the tribes with large gaming revenues,
many of them dependent entirely on gaming for their existence. The "Lottery
Tribes," as they become known, break away from the rest, known as the
"Gaming Tribes," and form their own council. Over the course of the next
month or so, the Lottery Tribes begin to talk about how to weight the lottery.
They start with the concepts articulated in 25 C.F.R. Part 83, recently
abolished by Congress, and move on from there. The sessions break down
quickly, with the same group of tribes with large land bases ganging up on the
smaller tribes. Toledo takes more sips from the vial but the water appears to
be losing its effectiveness.
Outside of the two "councils," the Gaming Tribes engage in a scheme to
politically break down key members of Congress and overturn the Self-
Reliance Act. These tribes knew that they are few and the remainder of the
tribes will likely vote them out of existence. The scheme fails miserably.
Members of Congress stand fast against the tribes, rejecting out-of-hand all
lunches, dinners, and donations to the respective parties. The vast majority
of Congress states uniformly that they want the tribes to decide this
themselves.
A week after he sips the last of his vial, Toledo announces that he is
sickened by the spectacle before him and withdraws in disgust against the
wishes of the Grand Traverse Band's Tribal Council. The Council approves
of the "weighted lottery" strategy, even with its flaws. Toledo returns to work
and writes a piece for a national magazine condemning Congress for its
sadism in forcing the tribes to choose among themselves for those who will be
302. Derrick Bell, The Space Traders, in FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL 158 (1992).
303. Cf Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the
Innovating Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REv. 953, 1012 (1996) (proposing a "weighted lottery" for
choosing candidates for admission into highly-selective educational institutions).
304. 44 Fed. Reg. 7235 (1979).
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executed and for those who will survive. His article is based on the work of
Primo Levi, who wrote of the Holocaust victims that "[o]nly the worst
survived.""3 5 Toledo likens Congress's Council for Unifying and Stabilizing
Tribes Equally and Responsibly to a Nazi death camp and the camp at
Wounded Knee just prior to the massacre. Toledo predicts that the body
Congress has created and imposed upon the tribes amounts to nothing more
than a "Final Solution" - a genocide that is finally complete.
The Supreme Court hears a special set of four oral arguments over two days
in late summer - one for each petitioner - and promises a quick return on
a single decision by mid-autumn.
Toledo's prediction rings true and the Council for Unifying and Stabilizing
Tribes Equally and Responsibly breaks down into further camps - including
a substantial portion of tribes that refuse to participate - none of which can
garner the necessary votes to reach a complete decision. By late October, the
camps generate five separate lists of 100, all of which contain mutually
exclusive tribes.
A last-ditch effort by a collection of Indian activists argues with the various
councils that they should not agree to concede to the federal government's
conceptions of Indian tribal relationships.3"6 There are a few days in which
the five councils reunite to form a single council and discuss this new
proposal. It calls for the reintegration of the great tribes into one mass. All
of the Sioux nations would reunite into the Great Sioux Nation. All of the
Chippewa tribes would reunite. All of the Ottawa tribes and the Apache tribes
and the Potawatomis and the Seminoles and the Cherokees would join
together again. But then the confederated tribes speak up. What about the
Cheyenne-Arapaho? What about the Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes
and the Confederated Tribes of the Colville and Yakama reservations? Are
they going to be stuck together forever? And what about the various Chippewa
tribes that feud with each other? How can they be one? The attempt breaks
down completely when an unnamed prankster circulates a flyer likening the
proposal to Kurt Vonnegut's "granfalloon," ".a proud and meaningless
association of human beings. '3 °7 The Council disintegrates and all hopes rest
305. PRIMo LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED 82 (1986).
306. "[T]hose indigenous governments which traditionally held regulatory and enforcement
power within Indian Country - not the "more modern" and otherwise non-traditional "tribal
councils" imposed upon Indians by the federal government under the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934 - should have the right to resume their activities now." Winona LaDuke, Preface:
Succeeding into Native North America: A Secessionist View, in CHURCHILL, STRUGGLE FOR THE
LAND, supra note 289, at 12.
307. KURT VONNEGUT, WAMPETERS, FOMA & GRANFALLOONS (OPINIONS) xv (Dell
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with the Supreme Court, the very worst place for Indian tribes to rest their
case.
308
The Wednesday before Thanksgiving, only two weeks before Congress's
deadline, the Court returns with its decision. Four Justices uphold the act on
the basis of the plenary power of Congress in Indian affairs,0 9 the political
question doctrine,31° the equal protection clause, attempting to expressly
overrule Morton v. Mancari,311 just as the Ninth Circuit almost held in
Williams v. Babbitt,312 based on the strict scrutiny test articulated in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,31 3 and the elimination of the trust doctrine,
emphasizing Justice Thomas's footnote in his White Mountain Apache
dissent.314 These Justices state broadly in a footnote that, had Congress seen
fit to de-recognize all Indian tribes, it had the power to do so. Two Justices
begin and end their analysis on the Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence of
Hodel v. Irving31 5 and Babbitt v. Youpee, 3 16 striking down the Act as an
unconstitutional taking of property rights without due process. The final three
Justices are split three ways. One strikes down the Act on the basis that cases
such as Seminole Nation3 17 that articulated the trust relationship still have
validity and that Indian tribes are a critical part of the shared heritage of all
Americans. This Justice agrees with the Indian petitioners that the Self-
Reliance Act is thinly veiled genocide, quoting several times from Toledo's
article. Another Justice strikes down the Act on the narrow (but patently
Publishing 1989).
308. See Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 42, at 281 (noting that Indian tribes fare
worse in the Supreme Court that prisoners); David E. Getches, Conquering the Cultural
Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1573,
1594 (1996) ("[A]s tribal assertions of jurisdiction became more extensive, the Court started to
retreat from its modem-era affirmations of unextinguished tribal powers, altering the margins
of the tribes' jurisdiction in order to preserve the values and interests of the larger society.").
309. See cases cited supra note 271.
310. See Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana v. Babbitt, 255 F.3d 342, 346-47 (7th Cir.
2001) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
311. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
312. 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Kawerak Reindeer Herders Ass'n
v. Williams, 523 U.S. 1117 (1998).
313. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
314. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 123 S. Ct. 1126, 1138 n.1 (2003)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
315. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
316. 519 U.S. 234 (1997).
317. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
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specious) basis that the Act does not meet the rational basis test of Weeks3 1
and Morton v. Moncari.319
The deciding Justice also agrees to strike down the Self-Reliance Act,
ending the year-long misery of the Indian tribes. This Justice does not join
any other opinion, nor does this Justice write an opinion on the merits.
Instead, this Justice quotes from Felix S. Cohen:
In the history of Western thought, theologians, missionaries,
judges, and legislators for 400 years and more have consistently
recognized the right of Indians to manage their own affairs.
Nothing that we could say today in defense of Indian rights of self-
government could be as eloquent as the words of Francisco de
Vitoria in 1532 or of Pope Paul Im in 1537 or of Bartholomew de
las Casas in 1542 or of Chief Justice Marshall in 1832. For 400
years, men who have looked at the matter without the distortions
of material prejudice or bureaucratic power have seen that the
safety and freedom of all of us is inevitably tied up with the safety
and freedom of the weakest and the tiniest of our minorities. This
is not novel vision but ancient wisdom.32 °
IV. Back to Reality: Treaty-Making in the Federal Courthouse
In the treaty era, the federal government sometimes used alcohol to coerce
or trick Indian leaders into signing truly dreadful treaties. Intentionally or not,
federal courts generate the same results in the modern era, the so-called self-
determination era, as the old Indian Agents. A hundred or a hundred fifty
years ago, Indian tribes agreed to trade off a chunk of land here and a slice of
civil jurisdiction there in exchange for protection and the preservation of their
culture and resources 32' and the federal or state government took ten or twenty
times more than they promised. Now, the federal courts take the rest.
318. Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
319. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
320. COHEN, Indian Self-Government, supra note 105, at 306.
321. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., "The People of the States Where They are Found are Often
Their Deadliest Enemies": The Indian Side of the Story of Indian Rights and Federalism, 38
ARIz. L. REv. 981, 992 (1996) ("Indians regarded the duty to provide protection to a treaty
partner, like all of the sacred bonds of a treaty relationship, as a continuing legal and moral
obligation .... If anything, because a treaty connected the two sides together literally as
relatives, a treaty partner who had grown stronger over time was under an increased obligation
of protection toward its now weaker partner.").
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Congress stopped authorizing treaties with Indian tribes in 1871,322 but
treaties are still being signed. Sometimes they're called land claim settlement
acts-.. or reaffirmation acts .. or restoration acts325 or self-determination acts
31 6
or social service remedial acts.327 The tribes are even signing treaties with the
states, such as tribal-state tax agreements 328 and gaming compacts.3 29 But
when Indians and their adversaries bring those agreements or statutes or even
the old treaties to federal courts for review or to resolve conflicts over their
meaning, federal courts have little problem rewriting those agreements.330
Strong arguments matter not. Tribes only barely survived five centuries of
genocide. Nevertheless, some believe that tribes did not survive. To them, the
mere existence of Indians and Indian tribes in the modem day is implausible.
The current logic appears to be that strong arguments supporting tribal
sovereignty or tribal jurisdiction are, by definition, therefore, implausible.
This article serves as the narrative testimonial of an attorney who is a
322. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71).
323. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 1300i to 1300i-11 (2000) (Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act).
324. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 1300k to 1300k-7 (2000) (reaffirming the Little Traverse Bay
Bands of Odawa Indians and the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians).
325. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 13001 to 13001-7 (2000) (restoring the Auburn Indian
Rancheria).
326. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 4101 (2000) (Native American Housing Assistance and Self-
Determination Act); 25 U.S.C. §§ 450 to 458bbb-2 (2000) (Indian Self Determination and
Education Assistance Act).
327. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000) (Indian Child Welfare Act).
328. See, e.g., Tax Agreement Between the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians and
the State of Michigan (Dec. 20, 2002) available at www.michigan.gov/documents/LTBB-
Agreement-58762-7.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2003).
329. See, e.g., Compact Between the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians
and the State of Michigan (Aug. 20, 1993) (on file with author).
330. See, e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 404 (1994) ("Congress can unilaterally alter
reservation boundaries.") (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567-68 (1903)); cf.
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. United States Attorney for the Western
District of Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 924 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (finding that the Secretary of
the Interior "improperly" terminated the trust relationship between the United States and the
Grand Traverse Band through a misreading of a treaty). But cf United States v. Washington,
235 F.3d 438, 442 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Here, the State in effect urges us to conclude that the 1864
secretarial order diminished the rights of treaty tribes. We reject that crabbed interpretation. We
doubt that treaty rights, ratified by the United States Congress, can be so readily altered by mere
orders of the Secretary of the Interior."). In Federal Power Comm 'n v. Tuscarora Indian
Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960), a case where the federal government took Indian land in exchange
for a money payment where the Tribe had been promised the land forever, Justice Hugo Black
(a former Klansman) wrote, "Great nations, like great men, should keep their word." Id. at 142
(Black, J., dissenting).
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member of a Michigan Indian tribe and who also serves as a staff attorney for
that tribe, has also served as a staff attorney for three other Indian tribes in
Arizona, California, and Washington, and is an appellate judge for yet another
Michigan Indian tribe. The process of learning the law as a practitioner is
radically different than reading the law as a law student. What we learn by
studying Federal Indian Law in law school or reading law review articles is
merely "the sound of 500 footnotes clapping."33' The more important question
is how the parties achieved that bottom line. Knowing that Oliphant stands
for the proposition that Indian tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians is one thing. "It is a logical enough theory, impregnable in the
library." '332 Knowing how the Suquamish Tribe reacted to and suffered from
that proposition is entirely another thing.
According to the Supreme Court, history is against Indian tribes.333 More
and more attorneys are entering the field of Federal Indian Law and must be
prepared to respond to accusations of perpetrating revisionist history334 and
unmitigated hostility from politicians,335 other commentators,336 and, of
331. Frank Pommersheim, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: A Little Haiku Essay on a Missed
Constitutional Moment, 38 TULSA L. REv. 49, 49 n.al (2002).
332. John Barker Waite, Comment, Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42 MICH. L.
REv. 679,685 (1944) (quoted in Yale Kamisar, The Writings of John Barker Waite and Thomas
Davies on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1821, 1823 (2002)).
333. See generally Douglas B.L. Endreson, A Review of the 1990s and a Look at What's
Ahead, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 611,622 (1998) ("[Two hundred years] of federal neglect must
be overcome .. "); Joseph William Singer, Well Settled?: The Increasing Weight of History
in American Indian Land Claims, 28 GA. L. REv. 481,482 (1994) ("It is a great deal more than
merely unfortunate that the Vermont Supreme Court failed to accord its American Indian
citizens the same level of protection for their property rights as it accords its non-Indian citizens.
It is tragic that this disparity of treatment existed not only in the distant past but persists to this
day.").
334. See generally Joseph D. Matal, A Revisionist History of Indian Country, 14 ALASKA L.
REv. 283 (1997).
335. See, e.g., Implementation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Hearing Before the
Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 102d Cong. 5 (1992) (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton, Member,
Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs) (referring to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act as an
"unmitigated disaster"); D'arcy McNickle, Indian and European: Indian-White Relations from
Discovery to 1887, 311 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCl. 1, 9 (1957) ("'What good man
would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a few thousand savages to our
extensive Republic ... ?") (quoting President Andrew Jackson).
336. One commentator, reviewing a bizarre revisionist history of Andrew Jackson, wrote:
"To his dying day .... Remini concludes, "Andrew Jackson genuinely believed
that what he had accomplished rescued these people from inevitable annihilation.
And although that sounds monstrous, and although no one in the modem world
wishes to accept or believe it, that is exactly what he did. He saved the Five
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course, opposing attorneys. Attorneys advocating on behalf of Indian tribes
must react to and quash unrelenting anti-Indian sentiment. It is not an easy
task and the case law is against Indian tribes.337 Nevertheless, given the
history of Indians and Indian tribes in the United States, few other areas of
substantive law offer more compelling reasons to practice in those areas. That
same continuing history also must be explored and utilized to persuade judges
and policymakers.
Tribal advocates must never forget how it is Indians and Indian tribes came
to be in the position they are in now.338 It is easy for opponents to state again
Civilized Nations from probable extinction."
Richard White, How Andrew Jackson Saved the Cherokees, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 443, 452 (2002)
(reviewing and quoting from ROBERT V. REMINi, ANDREW JACKSON AND His INDIAN WARS
(2001)). For examples of anti-Indian commentaries, see Editorial, supra note 46, at A14; Fred
Dickey, Indian Casinos Open Wayfor Black Reparations, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, at B 13
(arguing that revenue from Indian casinos should be treated as reparations for Indians and in the
process disparaging the case for Black reparations); Editorial, Big Chief Pataki, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 1, 2002, at A14 (utilizing stereotypes and prejudice against Native Americans to criticize
Indian gaming in New York State).
337. "My own sense is that, in its federal Indian law jurisprudence, the Court has been doing
nothing more than balancing the interests it perceives as salient in the cases. The interests that
the Court seems to find most understandable are on the non-Indian side of the case." Frickey,
Adjudication and Its Discontents, supra note 298, at 1775. And when the attorney for the White
Mountain Apache described Fort Apache as a fort "established to kill Apaches and imprison
them," Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 123
S. Ct. 1126 (2003) (No. 01-1-67), the Court corrected him - "I thought the fort was to protect
white settlers." Id.
338. As to the history of the Grand Traverse Band, George Bennett wrote:
Property speculators used fraud, intimidation, and corrupt federal officials to steal
land rightfully belonging to Grand Traverse Band members in the late 19th and on
into the mid-20th Centuries. The 1855 treaty marks the first manifestation of the
federal government's devastating Allotment Policy, which history states began in
1887 with the passage of the Dawes Act. Not so. The federal government used
Ottawa and Chippewa bands in Michigan as guinea pigs for allotment over 30
years before Congressional policy shifted into full gear. The 1855 treaty provided
for the allotment in severalty of Indian lands with only a ten-year trust period,
fifteen years fewer than the 24 or 25-year trust periods contained in most allotment
statutes enacted after 1887. The resulting devastation brought the Grand Traverse
Band to the absolute brink of extinction, near the "certain death" that Aghosa and
Eshquagonabe feared. They thought they had preserved half of Leelanau
County - about five townships - for the 1855 reservation, but by 1979, just
prior to federal recognition, there remained no land held in trust by the federal
government and only a few acres remained in a trust held by Leelanau County.
Hearing on S. 2986, a Bill to Provide for and Approve the Settlement of Certain Land Claims
of the Bay Mills Indian Community, Michigan Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs,
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and again the Indians get tax exemptions, they get unregulated gaming, they
get this and they get that,33 9 but tribal advocates must never allow their
adversaries to get away with that sort of muckraking. Tribal advocates must
arm themselves with knowledge and perspective of tribal history and inform
the court and policymakers exactly how each federal court decision affects
Indian people to their very core.
The fable of the discovery of the Fountain of Youth by an Indian tribe is
intended to present the array of modem challenges Indian tribes will face as
they become more political powerful and infused with more resources.34 °
Surely, John Marshall would never have envisioned that some Indian tribes
would survive off of treaty fishing or their timber resources or with the
assistance of gaming facilities. A congressional act essentially terminating
over eighty percent of currently recognized Indian tribes seems remote in the
modem age where many tribes wield incredible political influence.34' Sadly,
federal and state courts have not followed the tribes into the modem age.
Even while century-old Indian cases become more archaic, they maintain their
unfortunate relevance to judges and their clerks.
Sometimes, tribal advocates must remind their opponents and the decision
makers just how the Indians and tribes that remain came ever so close to the
brink of extinction. Federal Indian Law, unfortunately, defines the public
existence of Indians and Indian tribes and, though rough attempts surely have
been made, it must not be allowed to define Indian culture and tradition. The
cold, sometimes heartless, language of the statutes and cases must be
enlivened by tribal attorneys and advocates. It is ever so easy to treat Federal
Indian Law as another scholastic enterprise, perhaps one more complicated
107th Cong. 15-16 (2002) (Prepared Statement of George Bennett, Council Member, Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians) (on file with author).
339. See, e.g., Jenny Price, Associated Press, Wisconsin GOP Drops Controversial Cartoon
(Apr. 17, 2003) ("The state Republican Party dropped a cartoon from its Web site that claimed
taxpayers were 'scalped' by the governor's new gaming compact with an Indian tribe after
complaints it was racist and derogatory. The cartoon depicted a tomahawk flying through the
air at a Wisconsin taxpayer. The voiceover said: 'As taxpayers, we got scalped.').
340. See generally Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and Commentary,
supra note 95, at 12 n.37 ("One major piece that is missing in the law review writing is a
narrative of success, which identifies the local triumphs that arise in the field and demonstrates
how more achievements along these lines can occur within the confines of the current state of
the law.").
341. See Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No.
02AS04545, slip op. at 4, 2003 WL 733094 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003) ("[Tlhe Tribe's
contributions to political campaigns and employment of legislative lobbyists [are] ... quite
extensive....").
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than others and rich in depth and history. One must never treat Federal Indian
Law as a toy, as a curiosity.342 Each word written on paper and each word
spoken must have meaning - in some cases, over 500 years of meaning.
Migwetch.
A warrior should not say something fainthearted even casually.
He should set his mind to this beforehand. Even in trifling matters
the depths of one's heart can be seen. 3 3
342. "Federal Indian law does not deserve its image as a tiny backwater of law inhabited by
impenetrably complex and dull issues." Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARv. L. REV.
381, 383 (1993).
343. YAMAMOTO TSUNETOMO, HAGAKURE: THE BOOK OF THE SAMURAI 51 (William Scott
Wilson trans., 1979).
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